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Abstract 
This study examines leadership and statebuilding in the very specific context of the 
transition of a rebel group to a governing entity of a post-conflict state by comparing the 
cases of Mozambique and South Sudan.  Drawing on theories of political leadership, 
statebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, and recent studies on political legitimacy, 
this study provides insight into the processes by which leaders interact with and build the 
institutions of state that both enable their governance and that may ultimately constrain 
their authority, and the impact of external actors on these processes.  This study focuses 
particularly on the critical interaction between political leaders and the institution of the 
rebel group turned political party that they lead in the fragile post-conflict period.  This 
study traces how FRELIMO in Mozambique and the SPLM in South Sudan built 
sufficient political legitimacy in order to be considered the natural party of governance 
upon independence in each country.  It also compares how RENAMO in Mozambique 
sought to make the transition from rebels to politicians.  It then closely examines how 
leaders’ and parties’ political legitimacy was built or lost in subsequent years and the 
impact of this on building the critical institutions of state and ultimately on the stability of 
that state.   
Both cases highlight, for different reasons, that leaders matter particularly when 
institutions are weak.  This report contends that a critical causal mechanism in a 
successful transition from fighting a war to governing a country is establishing and 
maintaining legitimacy – both internally with the governed population and externally 
with key international partners.  How leaders balance internally derived and externally 
derived legitimacy often proves to be important.  External actors are often fundamental in 
bestowing legitimacy on armed groups, even when there are other groups claiming to 
represent the interests of the population.  While externally derived legitimacy is 
important in getting these parties into power, sources of internal legitimacy, derived from 
their own populations by parties and leaders, are critical in shaping their ability to offer 
stable government.  Each case demonstrates that legitimacy must be maintained in order 







Former rebel groups govern a significant number of states in the world – in Asia, Europe, 
Latin America and Africa – that span the full spectrum of fragility and systems of 
government.  Given the significant number of civil wars in the 1990s a large number of 
states continue to be in the process of post-conflict reconstruction.  Many of these states 
are relatively stable; many are not.  Many are considered successful democracies; many 
are considered authoritarian.  Those that are stable today may not remain so.  Billions of 
dollars are spent each year through the UN system and bilaterally to support statebuilding 
and consolidate peace in those states that remain in critical shape.   
A greater understanding of how these ‘rebel-led’ states come to be, gain legitimacy in the 
transition to civilian governance, and can be expected to interact with external actors is 
fundamental to international relations. 
Many ex-rebel leaders and parties remain ‘unreconstructed’.  In civilian government they 
continue to see all challenges through the lens of their earlier battles, which define their 
foreign policy, internal security and economic policy – and how they use and influence 
the institutions of state.  Plus the same party has governed many of these states since the 
end of their respective civil wars, which raises the likelihood of state capture by political 
parties, where the governing party sees itself as inseparable from the state.  This in turn 
increases the likelihood that political contest is not conducted via the ballot box but 
behind the closed doors of the governing party room or on the street.  Understanding the 
transition of political parties from wartime to peacetime is as important as understanding 
the transition of individual leaders.  The interaction of leaders and their parties can be a 
determining factor in how successful a ‘rebel-led’ government is in building the 
institutions of state and in overseeing a sustainable transition to peace. 
State reconstruction in post-conflict societies entails recreating a wide array of 
institutions against the backdrop of political polarisation, a fragile social consensus, and 
dysfunctional formal economies.  Reconstruction involves resuscitating effective state 
authority, promoting reconciliation, building a modicum of governing legitimacy, and 
resuming economic activities.  In addition, since civil wars disproportionately rupture 
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civilian institutions of governance, a key priority is often redressing the imbalance 
between civilian and military institutions (Khadiagala 2006). 
National leaders set the agenda for this enterprise.  They set the tone, set an example, and 
provide a vision and a path to follow.  Such leaders are not just the individuals that 
emerge as the Head of Government of a newly peaceful state, or members of a newly 
formed Cabinet, but include those who led the losing side in a civil conflict, those who 
lead the military and police, and influential community members such as religious or 
local traditional leaders. 
There is considerable literature that explores the relationship between leaders and 
followers and the interaction between leaders and institutions.  Studying the variable of 
leadership inevitably draws out long-standing structure-agency debates in political 
science and ‘great man/woman’ theories of history.  These debates highlight the necessity 
of understanding the role of individual agency, as well as the social and economic 
circumstances within which leaders operate and over which they may have little influence.   
Weber (1947) highlights a role for ‘charismatic’ leaders, particularly at times when 
institutional constraints are limited.  When institutions are weak or lacking, Weber 
considers that leaders can substitute for other institutions of state, such as national 
bureaucracies.  Khadiagala (2006) poses the dilemma of leadership in post-conflict 
reconstruction ‘as that of strong personalities and weak governance institutions’.  He 
argues that ‘leaders that are grounded in institutions are particularly important in post-
conflict reconstruction, but they are always in short supply because institutions are either 
weak or strong individuals frequently overwhelm these institutions’.  Khadiagala and 
Lyons observe the most successful cases of state reconstruction following civil war reveal 
leadership patterns of strong individuals operating within the constraints of organisations 
such as political parties or national/liberation movements (Khadiagala and Lyons 2006).  
The particular conditions of post-conflict reconstruction place enormous constraints on 
leaders and political parties. 
This report analyses the interaction of leadership and institutions in the process of 
statebuilding through a consideration of two case studies: Mozambique and South Sudan.  
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Each case is an example of a very specific type of leadership in a very specific context – 
the transition of a ‘rebel’ or armed movement to a civilian government, following a 
negotiated settlement of a civil war, in a state with limited institutions of state and low 
human capital.  Mozambique and South Sudan are two examples that allow a study of 
leadership under the constraints of post-conflict reconstruction, by tracing how their 
leaders and political parties transitioned from wartime to peacetime and sought to build a 
state.   
Despite sharing some broad characteristics and circumstances, in each case the 
relationship between leaders and political parties was very different, the source of 
governing legitimacy for the ruling party and leaders was very different, and the nature of 
the post-transition administration was very different.  In Mozambique, while individual 
leaders had considerable influence over the direction of the party and the country, the 
liberation party FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) constrained those 
leaders and remained the engine of ideology, policy formulation and decision-making.  
Even as its ideology has softened over time, and internal divisions have become more 
apparent, the party has had a unified political leadership for over 45 years, through four 
leadership transitions.  FRELIMO, despite having never lost a national election, operates 
within a democratic system and has a consistent opposition, its antagonist in the 
‘destabilisation war’ of the 1980s, RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana).  
However, in a worrying trend that threatens Mozambique’s stability, RENAMO’s leader 
has increasingly turned away from the ballot box and reverted to violence to seek 
concessions from the government.   
The governing party of South Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), 
in many ways has never functioned as a political party, has been entirely characterised by 
individual leaders, has split multiple times, lacks a governing ideology and is not able to 
constrain individuals let alone set a policy direction for the country.  The inability of the 
SPLM to manage internal political contestation has been one of the key drivers (in deadly 
combination with flaws in the security sector) of the descent into civil war in South 
Sudan at the end of 2013.  While ostensibly a democracy, in reality South Sudan is a 
single-party autocracy.  South Sudan has not had a national election since independence, 
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with little prospect for elections in the near-to-medium term.  In a deeply militarised body 
politic there are no credible opposition political entities as most political actors are 
aligned with various sides in the ongoing armed conflict rather than any civilian political 
institution. 
Both cases highlight, for different reasons, that leaders matter, particularly when 
institutions are weak.  Drawing on theories of leadership and political legitimacy, this 
report contends that these differences, alongside other factors such as the influence of 
external actors, contributed to the different levels of political stability in Mozambique 
and South Sudan after the transition from war, which directly affected the ability of the 
new governing party to establish and build the institutions of state, which ultimately 
affected the sustainability of peace in each country.   
Specifically this research analyses how leaders transitioned from fighting a civil war to 
leading a civilian government in Mozambique and South Sudan by asking several 
questions.  How did FRELIMO in Mozambique and the SPLM in South Sudan transition 
from civil war to civilian government and create and maintain institutions of state?  What 
was the interaction between leaders and political parties in this process?  What was the 
influence of external actors in this process of transition?  Did this transition lead to 
peace?  In particular, were there particular leadership or institutional conditions from 
‘rebel days’ in Mozambique and South Sudan that affected the processes of statebuilding 
after the cessation of war? 
This report contends that a critical causal mechanism in a successful transition is 
establishing and maintaining legitimacy – both internally with the governed population 
and externally with key international partners.  Thus a key factor in this analysis will be 
identifying how leaders and political parties gained and maintained legitimacy as they 
waged war, and then as they sought to establish themselves as civilian governments.  
External actors were often fundamental in bestowing legitimacy on these armed groups, 
even when there were other groups claiming to represent the interests of the population.  
In both cases charismatic early leaders of the movements were able to persuade key 
external actors to back their cause or movement, which ultimately proved influential in 
the negotiated settlements that gave FRELIMO and the SPLM power upon 
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independence/self-government.  While externally derived legitimacy was important in 
getting these parties into power, the sources of internal legitimacy, derived from their 
own populations by parties and leaders, were critical in shaping their ability to offer 
stable government. 
This report is structured as follows: Chapter One provides an overview of relevant 
leadership, post-conflict reconstruction and civil war literature and theories that form the 
conceptual frame of the proceeding analysis; Chapter Two outlines the methodology of 
this research, including detail on case selection and the variables under study; Chapter 
Three outlines a case study of leadership in Mozambique; Chapter Four outlines a case 
study of leadership in South Sudan; and Chapter Five offers some comparative analysis, 
observations and conclusions. 
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Chapter One – Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
Leadership 
Leadership as a variable of state and government has been the subject of academic 
analysis for millennia.  Modern writers, such as Nannerl Keohane (2005) – making 
passing reference to depictions of leadership in Plato’s The Republic and Aritostle’s 
Politics – use Machiavelli’s The Prince as a touchstone to analyse the unique role of 
leaders and how they relate to and interact with the organisations and followers they lead.  
Or as Aristotle says, how ‘rulers rule and are ruled in turn’.  Much of the modern 
literature on political leadership also draws on Max Weber’s concepts of state from his 
speech ‘Politics as a vocation’ (Weber 1946) – sometimes directly comparing the 
approach of Machiavelli to Weber (see Levi 2006) – and his characterisations of political 
leadership in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Weber 1947).  The key 
debates explored in this literature are the relationship between leaders and followers and 
the relationship between leaders and institutions. 
A key contributor to theories of leadership and noted US Presidential biographer, James 
MacGregor Burns, notes: ‘political leadership is one of the most widely noted and 
reported and least understood phenomena in modern politics’ (Burns 1977).  He observes 
that many writers have dealt with political leaders with little concept of, or reference to, 
the role of political leadership.  In his view a theory of political leadership must be part of 
a more general theory of social or historical causation: ‘hence the student of political 
leadership must deal with the most refractory questions of political power and social 
change’.   
Burns seeks to set out a general theory of leadership that has at its core the following 
relationship between leader and follower: ‘Leadership over human beings is exercised 
when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilise, in competition or conflict with 
others, their own institutional, political, psychological and other resources in such a 
manner as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.  This is done in order 
to satisfy similar needs and values held by both leaders and followers.  In brief, leaders 
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with motive and power bases tap followers' motive bases in order to realise the purposes 
of both leaders and followers’.  
While much of the historic analysis of leadership focuses on the decisions leaders make 
and the qualities they are thought to possess, some writers have sought to develop Burns’ 
theory of leadership in order to drill down to the specifics of the process of leadership and 
its interaction with institutions.  Much of this analysis occurs against the backdrop of the 
broader debates within social science over the role of individuals – or the structure-
agency debate – plus critiques of the ‘great man’ or ‘great woman’ approaches to historic 
scholarship. 
Leftwich (2009) surveys the considerable literature on leadership, institutions and 
statebuilding against the structure-agency problem that he argues ‘is an old one in social 
science’ (referring to the work of Giddens 1979, McAnulla 2002, Hay 2002).  He writes: 
‘the structure-agency problem concerns the key issue about how socio-economic and 
political behaviour is to be explained.  On the one hand are explanations that give 
emphasis to structural and institutional factors which shape and govern behaviour; on the 
other hand are explanations which place greater emphasis on the autonomy of agents and 
agency.  In short, what is the balance between structure and agency in explaining 
outcomes in any given situation?’. 
Addressing the structure-agency debate, Keohane (2005) notes: ‘the scope of leadership 
differs from that of most other human activities.  The issues that leaders must address 
have broad implications, and a large number of human beings are affected.  In many 
situations, leadership involves an organisational context that gives this particular person 
the authority to make those decisions and assemble those resources.  No one else has the 
same opportunities or obligations.  There is a legitimacy about the leader’s role that sets it 
apart from other human behavior’.   
She notes: ‘by their actions, leaders make a difference in the organisations they lead.  It 
has been fashionable for some time to dismiss the “great man” theory of history in 
reaction to what was surely an over-reliance on this theory in the past’.  She writes: 
‘instead, historians and social scientists often concentrate on the constraints that leaders 
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face, the role of followers in shaping the leader’s behaviour, and the importance of 
circumstance.  These are all important factors.  But so are the choices leaders make’. 
Margaret Levi, in her exploration of a theory of government, outlines the role of 
leadership in the following terms: ‘Leadership aligns incentives, helps design and 
redesign institutions, provides the learning environment that enables individuals to 
transform or revise beliefs, and plays a major role in inducing preferences.  Most 
importantly, leadership – both of government and within civil society – provides the 
human agency that coordinates the efforts of others.  This is not a question of a 
Machiavellian Prince, who manipulates the populace to achieve his ends, but of a 
leadership that combines some of the strategic and other competences Machiavelli 
describes with the Weberian "ethics of responsibility”’ (Levi 2006, referencing Keohane 
2005).  Reiterating a common refrain, Levi highlights: ‘leadership is empowered by 
institutions and popular support, but is also curbed by them’.  
Leftwich reiterates that there is widespread agreement in the international community and 
amongst researchers that ‘institutions matter for stable and secure states, economic 
growth, political democracy and inclusive social development’.  However, this ‘emphasis 
on institutions – that is the structural arrangements – has either ignored, or obscured 
human agency – individual or collective – from both analytical work and international 
policy and operational thinking and practices’.   
Leftwich sets up an analytical framework to identify ‘developmental leadership’ based on 
the starting point that, on their own, structural conditions produce nothing without agents; 
and that, likewise, institutions (understood in simple Northian terms as the rules of the 
game) are empty boxes without the agents (players) that shape, operate, maintain, 
undermine or change them.  ‘Structure is not destiny’.   
He concludes that developmental leadership was best understood as a contextually 
contingent political process wherein: ‘leadership implies the organisation or mobilisation 
of people and resources (economic, political and other) in pursuit of particular ends (such 
ends may be change-oriented, radical or reformist; they may be static and conservative); 
following Weber, leadership must always be understood contextually, occurring within a 
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given configuration of power, authority and legitimacy, shaped by history, institutions, 
goals and political culture; and leadership regularly involves forging formal or informal 
coalitions, vertical or horizontal, of leaders and elites, in order to solve the pervasive 
collective action problems which define the challenges of growth and development’.   
Leadership – civil war to civilian government 
Considering the transition of leaders from wartime to civilian leadership is not new. 
Keohane (2005) makes mention of the difficulty of the transition of wartime to civilian 
leadership experienced by US Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Ulysses S. Grant, and 
the successful transitions of ‘resistance leaders’ George Washington and Charles de 
Gaulle.  Many writers compare the popular wartime leadership of Winston Churchill to 
his failure to attract support in peacetime. 
The large number of civil wars in Africa in the 1990s – in West Africa, the Great Lakes 
and the Horn of Africa – provides a large number of fresh examples of the transition of 
leaders from wartime to civilian government.  These governments, alongside those that 
emerged from the independence wars of the 1960s, offer a range of new, ongoing, and 
divergent case studies for scholars to weigh and reassess past theories of leadership and 
statebuilding. 
There is already a wide body of both qualitative and quantitative research focused on 
civil war’s causes, economic impact, duration, and resolution (see Licklider 1995, Herbst 
2000, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002, Collier and 
Sambanis 2002, Harbom, Hogbladh, and Wallensteen 2006); the effectiveness of 
peacekeeping in preventing recurrence (Werner 1999, De Waal 2009); the role of 
ethnicity in civil wars (Rothchild and Groth 1995, Kaufmann 1996, Fearon and Laitin 
2003) and the role of external states and spoilers (Stedman 1997, Cunningham 2010).  
There is also a constantly updated body of research on conflict statistics (for example, 
von Einsiedel 2014) . 
Several researchers have focused on the specifics of how statebuilding occurs when rebel 
movements transition to governments at the end of civil war, when ‘the exigencies of 
rebellion and the requirements of governing seem to be at cross-purposes’ (Lyons 2016).  
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The emphasis of much of this research is identifying the processes by which warring 
parties transition into democratic systems of government (see Dudouet 2009). 
Carrie Manning has done considerable work on political processes in Africa (2005), in 
particular the transition to multi-party democracy in Mozambique (Manning 2002a, b, 
2004, 2008, 2015) focusing on the importance of strengthening the institution of political 
parties.  Manning has particularly focused on the dual tracks for elite habituation in weak 
democracies – formal election processes and informal elite negotiation following closely 
contested or controversial elections – noting the stability of the political accommodation 
is highly dependent on the personality of leaders. 
Alongside his work with Khadiagala highlighting the importance of leadership 
(Khadiagala and Lyons 2006), similar to Manning, Lyons has considered the importance 
of processes that ‘demilitarise politics’ so that the warring parties may be transformed 
into political parties during the peace implementation period and thereby have the ability 
to participate effectively in post-conflict politics (Lyons 2005).  In terms of statebuilding, 
he notes: ‘civil wars are not periods of anarchy or political vacuum but are alternative 
systems of governance based on fear and predation and that reward violence.  If the 
insurgents remain unreconstructed, then the post-war regime is unlikely to be stable’ 
(Lyons 2016). 
As noted above, much of the research on the transition of armed groups at the end of civil 
war has focused on transitions into democratic systems of government.  However, there 
are many examples where rebel groups have transitioned into authoritarian states.  
Drawing from the literature on the role of political parties in authoritarian states and the 
literature on termination of civil wars by negotiated settlement, Lyons has identified 
causal mechanisms that link victorious rebels to strong authoritarian parties (Lyons 2016).  
He identifies several ways the legacies of war link to powerful military institutions’ 
ability to re-create themselves as powerful political institutions.  These are 1) the levels 
of solidarity and leadership coherence characteristic of successful insurgent groups; and 
2) the precedents and organisational structures developed during wartime governance of 
liberated territory.  The third and fourth are processes that are inherent to the war-to-
peace transition following rebel victory.  These are 3) post-war legitimacy derived from 
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military victory – “we rule because we won!”; and 4) the use of transitional processes, 
such as post-conflict elections, transitional justice, and demobilisation, as instruments of 
power consolidation. 
These four causal mechanisms can be reverse engineered as an analytical tool to assess 
the transition of rebels to less authoritarian and less strong post-conflict political parties.  
Lyons work focused on rebel groups who won an outright military victory and formed 
what have been considered successful authoritarian regimes in Rwanda, Ethiopia and 
Uganda (based on their longevity and ability to implement their policies).  Since the end 
of the Cold War an increasing number of civil conflicts have ended through negotiated 
settlement rather than outright victory.  The Human Security Report Project identified 
that over the period 1990-2005 58 armed conflicts terminated through a negotiated 
settlement compared with 28 conflicts that ended by military victory of one party 
(Human Security Report Project 2008).  Given the prevalence of civil wars that end in 
negotiated settlements – for example those in Mozambique and South Sudan studied in 
this report – it is important to consider theories that look at other sources of legitimacy.  
If a party cannot say ‘we rule because we won’, how does it derive governing legitimacy?  
‘We rule because we negotiated’? 
Schlichte and Schneckener (2016) address this issue directly, looking specifically at how 
armed groups gain and maintain political legitimacy.  Their analysis provides insight into 
how such groups build legitimacy during a conflict and then possibly transfer or maintain 
this legitimacy in their transition to governing.  They argue: “legitimacy is the key 
variable to explain such groups' political success, which is understood as the ability to 
gain political power and maintain such a position over a significant period of time”.  This 
implies ‘transferring military control into some sort of institutionalised power’.   
Schlichte and Schneckener identify three key challenges armed groups face with regard 
to legitimacy, some of which are shared with state actors: the use of violence, sources of 
legitimacy, and simultaneously seeking legitimacy from external and internal audiences.  
The first is that the use of violence cuts both ways – it can both legitimise and 
delegitimise actors.  Organised violence needs to be justified; to be legitimised.  Armed 
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actors usually need to explain or defend their violence and often do so as part of broader 
narratives such as liberation of communities from oppression, countering injustices, 
defending self-determination or protecting a community.  When organised violence is 
directed internally either within the group or communities that support it, then leaders 
often claim they are taking necessary action against defectors, collaborators or spies in 
defence of the broader goal.  The use of violence can therefore increase the legitimacy of 
an armed group as it demonstrates its power and may attract support as a result.  It can 
also delegitimise groups if it is used for too long or indiscriminately.  Armed groups 
diminish their ability to claim their goals are legitimate if they commit atrocities such as 
massacres of civilians, or systemic sexual violence.  Such acts diminish leaders’ 
credibility as well as traumatise communities that may be governed in the future by the 
group. 
Second, armed groups often need the capacity to adapt their sources of legitimacy over 
time if they want to maintain or expand their power base, particularly if they want to 
establish law and order in liberated zones or territories.  Schlichte and Schneckener 
highlight that gaining legitimacy when a group is unable to rely on the legal structures of 
a state often comes down to a populations’ belief in the leadership of a group.  The 
authors distinguish between symbolic legitimacy (what a group says) and performance-
based legitimacy (what a group does).  Sources of symbolic legitimacy can include 
traditional beliefs about qualities the leader is thought to possess, or perhaps they are 
related to a previous revered leader, or their actual professional experience.  A 
liberation/resistance movement may gain legitimacy by outlining an ideology that appeals 
to the aspirations of an oppressed group.  Symbolic legitimacy can also come from the 
perception the group creates of its enemy.  Schlichte and Schneckener write: ‘By 
portraying the enemy, be it the state or another armed group, as particularly brutal, 
inhuman and evil, the armed group aims not only to create solidarity but also to present 
itself and its violent actions as necessary, appropriate and comparatively less destructive’.   
Performance-based legitimacy can be gained by an armed group by actually improving 
the lives of those who they are governing compared to a colonial power or other armed 
group.  Other sources of this legitimacy can include the charisma of the leader and his 
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ability to communicate in inspirational terms to affected communities, the respect that 
armed groups gain from communities for their courage or selflessness in battle, the 
loyalties that leaders of groups are able to build through patrimonial networks, or 
conversely the following armed groups are able to build through developing transparent, 
non-patrimonial organisational structures such as party conferences or constitutions that 
develop a sense of inclusion and in some circumstances can offer groups a form of ‘legal-
rational’ legitimacy.  An overarching challenge for armed groups is that they can lose 
legitimacy if the gap between their words and actions widens.  The authors note that in 
the formative stage of a group symbolic sources of legitimacy are often paramount, but as 
the group develops over time performance-based legitimacy is much more important. 
The third challenge is armed groups need to address different audiences simultaneously – 
international, national and local – and something that, say, gains them legitimacy 
internationally could directly undermine legitimacy to a local audience.  While the most 
critical audience for an armed group is its internal audience – its future recruits, 
communities it wants to govern – increasingly successful armed groups are able to build 
legitimacy with international actors, including other governments, public opinion and 
NGOs.  This audience can be critical for recognition of an armed group as a political 
entity, for example when policies are set by mediators as to which groups are legitimate 
representatives worthy of a seat at the peace negotiation table.  Playing to an internal and 
an external audience can require a balancing act for leaders of armed groups, as an action 
that appeals to an external audience may not play to local expectations or cultural norms.  
Also moderating organised violence to appeal to international backers may weaken an 
armed group’s tactical position.  Likewise being linked too much to external actors may 
leave an armed group open to criticisms of being under control of ‘foreign powers’.  
Leaders of armed groups need to be able to navigate this balance in order to be successful. 
The authors highlight that further research into the interplay between the domestic and 
external sources of legitimacy would be an innovative way to use the politics of 
legitimacy to link comparative politics and international relations.  Hopefully this 
research makes a modest contribution in this respect. 
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Drawing on the work done by Manning (2004) and Dudouet (2009) on the transition of 
armed groups to civilian governments, Schlichte and Schneckener conclude that the 
degree of legitimacy a group can gain during the civil war is a key variable for explaining 
when armed groups are likely to transform successfully into a political party or social 
movement after a civil war.  
Several other researchers have looked at other aspects of the transition of rebel groups at 
the end of civil war.  For example, Wantchekon and Garcia-Ponce have considered the 
transition of independence movements to governments as anti-colonial insurgencies 
(Wantchekon and Garcia-Ponce 2013).  Several academics have considered the impact of 
fractures in rebel groups on post-conflict governance (Waldemariam 2011) and peace 
(Rudloff and Findley 2016). 
Post-conflict Reconstruction 
A wide body of literature surveys the challenges of post-conflict institution-building (see 
Addison 2001, Ottaway 2002, Aron 2003, Fukuyama 2004, Khadiagala 2006, Khadiagala 
and Lyons 2006).  Within the literature there is distinction between research on post-
conflict reconstruction following a civil war and following colonial wars of independence.  
This distinction is owing to the different political and security decisions, and possibly 
compromises, that are required by leaders to form institutions that can accommodate 
different sides of an armed conflict within one state at the end of conflict.  There are also 
distinctions in the literature between civil wars that end in outright victory, with the 
victor forming government of a post-conflict state and in many ways dictating the terms 
of post-conflict reconstruction, and civil wars that end in a negotiated settlement.  Again, 
how institutions are formed – negotiated – in these two different situations will be very 
different.  The role of external actors, including neighbouring countries, key donors and 
multilateral agencies such as the UN, will also be very different in each situation. 
This research focuses on post-conflict reconstruction in states where a civil war ended in 
a negotiated settlement, while also considering the impact of earlier transitions from 
liberation war to independence.   
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Ongoing fragility of institutions and poor leadership is likely to lead to a recurrence of 
conflict.  Ninety percent of the last decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that had 
already had a civil war in the last 30 years (Collier and Sambanis 2002).  
The central message of the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, 
Security and Development, WDR 2011 (The World Bank 2011) is: ‘strengthening 
legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is 
crucial to break cycles of violence’.  The Report highlights restoring confidence and 
transforming security, justice, and economic institutions requires ‘a combination of 
leadership and international support – normally, neither alone can suffice’.  
Drawing on North (1990) the WDR 2011 defines institutions as,  
the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’. They include formal rules, written 
laws, organisations, informal norms of behavior and shared beliefs – and the 
organisational forms that exist to implement and enforce these norms (both state 
and nonstate organisations).  Institutions shape the interests, incentives, and 
behaviors that can facilitate violence.  Unlike elite pacts, institutions are 
impersonal – they continue to function irrespective of the presence of particular 
leaders, and thus provide greater guarantees of sustained resilience to violence.  
Institutions operate at all levels of society – local, national, regional, and global.  
The WDR 2011 highlights that building the ‘legitimate institutions that can prevent 
repeated violence is, in plain language, slow. It takes a generation’.  It notes that the 
priorities for building legitimate institutions in conflict-affected countries are 
fundamentally different to those of stable developing countries.  The WDR 2011 notes 
the first priority is to restore confidence in collective action before embarking on wider 
institutional transformation.  Second is the priority of transforming institutions that 
provide citizen security, justice, and jobs.  Third, regional and international actors need to 
contain external stresses.  Fourth, is recognising the specialised nature of external support 
needed (The World Bank 2011).  
A considerable body of research on statebuilding in response to civil war has grown since 
the early 2000s.  That the 9/11 terrorists used Afghanistan as their training base 
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demonstrated that ‘failed states’ posed risks to more countries than their neighbours. 
Much of this research focuses on ‘failed states’ and explores the importance of building 
democratic institutions (see Fukuyama 2004, 2014, Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning 
2014).  Call has sought to move the debate beyond the ‘failed state’ narrative to identify 
the specific requirements of institution-building in the specific circumstances of: 
‘collapsed states’, states with weak formal institutional capacity or ‘weak states’, ‘war-
torn states’, and ‘authoritarian states/regimes’ (Call 2008, 2011). 
Relevant to research on statebuilding following a civil war, Call identifies three priority 
state functions that need to be re-established in the process of statebuilding in war-torn 
societies: security and the rule of law, public finance and economic policymaking, and 
legitimacy (Call and Wyeth 2008).  These draw upon the three types of resources that 
according to Charles Tilly need to be present to consolidate state power: coercion, capital 
and charisma (Tilly 1975). 
For Whaites (2008), to build a responsive state (as compared to an unresponsive state) 
involves establishing and strengthening institutions that support three necessary areas: 
stable political settlement, survival functions and expected functions.  Political settlement 
is also referred to as ‘elite consolidation’, or ‘elite pacts’ which for Whaites emphasises 
the centrality of processes that persuade elites to coexist peacefully.  As Whaites says: 
‘political settlements are not the same as peace agreements, but rather are the deeper, 
often unarticulated, understandings between elites that bring about the conditions to end 
conflict, but which also in most states prevent violent conflict from occurring’ (Whaites 
2008).  The WDR 2011 defines elite pacts as ‘formal or informal agreements by the 
holders of political, military, or economic power’ (The World Bank 2011).  
Following a civil war, particularly where that war did not result in partition, establishing 
a political settlement that accommodates those with access to violence in a new order is 
especially fraught.  Institutions that can accommodate peaceful contest amongst the elite 
become the key to longer-term stability and peace.  Different contexts will demand 
different solutions and often such institutions are established through a negotiated peace 
agreement and can include constitutional conventions, power-sharing agreements and a 
timetable for post-conflict elections.  In a fragile setting, the quality of the political 
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settlement establishing the rules of the game is deeply flawed (especially in terms of its 
exclusionary nature), is not resilient, and/or has become significantly undermined or 
contested (Rocha Menocal 2010). 
In summary, post-conflict statebuilding sets very limited choices for leaders, elites and 
coalitions.  How leaders interact with and accommodate other power bases, both 
externally and within their party, is critical to how they form and influence the 
institutions of state.  The strength of post-conflict institutions is seen as a key determinant 
for the stability, and thus the peacefulness, of the state.  While events and context matter, 
the decisions of leaders have an impact.  These decisions do not occur in a vacuum, and 
can be influenced by internal and external factors.  External actors including 
neighbouring countries, who can either be allies, threats or examples, can influence 
leaders.  Likewise the form and terms of external assistance from multilateral or bilateral 
partners can substitute and influence how leaders seek to build the institutions of state. 
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Chapter Two – Methodology and Case Selection 
The following research will analyse and illustrate the theories of leadership and post-
conflict reconstruction outlined above through a comparative examination of two cases: 
Mozambique and South Sudan. 
This report seeks to use a ‘structured, focused comparison’ between the two cases, as 
outlined in George and Bennett (2005).  While deceptively simple, this method involves 
comparing a small number of cases by asking the same questions across each case, in 
order to gain insight into broader themes and theories.   
Van Evera (1997) notes that case study analysis can be strengthened by choosing cases at 
the ‘extremes’ of the study variable, in this case leadership, in order to control for the 
effect of omitted variables.  Accordingly, this research will compare a situation of 
relative leadership ‘success’ (Mozambique) to one of leadership ‘failure’ (South Sudan) 
in order to study the impact of the independent variable ‘leadership’ on the dependent 
variable of ‘sustainable peace’ through the intervening variable of post-conflict 
institution-building.   
Mozambique is currently ranked 21 out of 54 countries on the Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance, whereas South Sudan is ranked 53, only ahead of Somalia.  Mozambique 
seems to have experienced relative stability since 1994, with some deterioration since 
2012, whereas South Sudan reverted to armed conflict in 2013 only two years after 
independence. 
In order to follow this method of comparative analysis, even when choosing cases ‘at the 
extremes’ the cases studied should be from a single class of events (as far as this is 
possible in international relations).  I have sought to identify two cases of African 
countries where a former belligerent in a civil war became the governing party following 
a negotiated settlement.  Mozambique and South Sudan also share a colonial background, 
low development indicators and an unexpected leadership transition at a difficult juncture 
following the sudden death of a charismatic leader of the party that transitioned to 
government. 
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There are a number of differences that make a strict comparison in search for co-variance 
difficult.  For example, FRELIMO transitioned from rebel group to governing party 
following the liberation war with Portugal and so was the governing party when it faced 
destabilisation from RENAMO shortly after independence.  So in effect, FRELIMO led 
two periods of statebuilding in Mozambique (the post-conflict period after the war of 
liberation, and the post-conflict period after the war of destabilisation).  Also, the 
territorial state of Mozambique existed with stable population and borders prior to the 
liberation war and the destabilisation war with RENAMO and its resolution.  In contrast, 
a referendum was held to determine whether the three southern provinces of Sudan would 
become the state of South Sudan (with its borders and citizenship criteria determined by 
the peace agreement).   
The above differences between the cases become less relevant when focusing on the 
study variable of leadership in each case, by answering the research question of how 
leaders interacted with their political party and with external actors in building 
institutions of state following their transition from rebel group to governing party (each 
case will be set out separately in Chapters Three and Four). 
In order to make as clear a comparison as possible I will concentrate analysis on the 
following shared stages in each case study: the formation of the political party/rebel 
group and briefly how it was led during the period of conflict; an outline of how each 
party was handed and maintained power via a negotiation; how leaders interacted with 
their political party to build institutions of state in the first few years following this 
negotiated settlement; how the relationship between leaders and their party was tested by 
leadership transitions (unexpected or scheduled); and the role of external actors in 
influencing the nature of the state in each case.   
For Mozambique, within-case comparison is also possible, both by comparing leadership 
in the governing party FRELIMO between its two periods of statebuilding, and by 
comparing the leadership transition of FRELIMO to the leadership transition of 
subsequent rebel group RENAMO.  For this reason, in order to draw out relevant 
conceptual points, the analysis on Mozambique in this report will be slightly longer than 
the analysis on South Sudan. 
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In analysing each case study I will apply the conceptual framework from Chapter One to 
the two cases to identify key comparative insights that illustrate or challenge the relevant 
theories on leadership and statebuilding as they pertain to the transition of rebel groups to 
government.  The analysis will be informed by the causal mechanisms identified by 
Lyons (2016) for the transition of a rebel group to a post-war government able to exert 
authority across a territory, in combination with Schlichte and Schneckener’s (2016) 
work on political legitimacy to modify the causal mechanism ‘we rule because we won’.    
In Chapter Five I will summarise my analysis from each case and draw some conclusions 
as to whether the characteristics of how leaders interacted with their political party and 
external actors had an impact on how leaders built the institutions of state following the 
end of civil war; and conclusions as to the causal relationship between leaders’ internal 
and external sources of legitimacy and the stability of the post-conflict regime.  
Empirical Sources 
This research primarily draws on text-based analysis from historians and political 
scientists who have written on the two case study countries.  This research also draws on 
contemporary media and country reports by well-recognised multilateral organisations 
and non-government organisations.  Where possible, this text-based analysis has been 
augmented with background interviews with experts on each country. 
In conducting this research I have identified several limits on the available sources of 
information.  Almost because of its leadership coherence over time, apart from books of 
speeches and the like, there have been few ‘tell-all’ books written by FRELIMO insiders 
on leadership tensions, factions or even personal histories.  Interviewees have also 
indicated that such books would not be in keeping with Mozambican culture where the 
preference is to keep such matters private.  The opposite seems to be true with South 
Sudan where, by virtue of the large number of defections from the SPLM over the years, 
there are a large number of ‘insider’ accounts of the parties’ machinations of varying 
detail and credibility.   
External analysis of Mozambique tends to be from very clear ideological perspectives – 
often either aligned to its early Marxist-Leninism, or from the perspective of its role in 
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the region’s broader history, or through the lens of its place in the Cold War order.  Plus, 
given the time that has elapsed since major events of its independence, the death of 
Samora Machel and even the peace process in 1990-1992, there are relatively limited 
sources available to researchers outside of Mozambique or in English.  This is magnified 
by the time limits on the University of Witwatersrand libraries’ subscriptions to 
international journals, which often only go back thirty years.  There are, however, several 
authoritative books outlining key early events that have been relied on by subsequent 
researchers that I also draw from in this report. 
Given the proximity of events in South Sudan there is copious recent analysis in journals 
and newspapers, and book publications of insider accounts that have come out as the 
research has proceeded.  I have endeavored to maintain an up-to-date awareness of recent 
publications that cover the relevant period.  By limiting my research scope to the end of 
2013, I have sought to avoid the research being drawn into reacting to ongoing 
developments in South Sudan.  
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Chapter Three – Case Study – Mozambique 
Introduction to Case Studies 
The cases of Mozambique and South Sudan each provide different perspectives from 
which to examine and illuminate the theories of leadership outlined above, including 
where leaders and the groups they lead derive their governing legitimacy in order to face 
the constraints inherent in building a state following the end of conflict.  Each case has 
something different to offer in terms of the sources of a leader’s legitimacy.   
For Mozambique individual leaders derived their legitimacy from their political party, 
FRELIMO, which had strong traditions of collective decision-making.  The party set the 
ideology, decided economic, political and security policy, and importantly selected its 
leaders.  The relationship between FRELIMO and its leaders is a classic example of 
leading ‘and being led in turn’.  The party itself derived legitimacy from external and 
internal sources to varying degrees at different times, and in any event was deemed the 
only legitimate governing force able to be handed power at the end of Portugal’s colonial 
era.  But Mozambique is a case that demonstrates that a party can lose legitimacy over 
time, especially if leaders decline in quality or if the party lacks sufficient accountability 
to those it governs. 
For South Sudan, while the governing party was again deemed the only political entity 
with sufficient legitimacy to govern at the end of the civil war, its legitimacy had limits.  
Individual leaders derived their legitimacy less from the party as an institution and more 
from it as a symbol.  Individual leaders proved to be considerably more powerful than the 
governing party.  South Sudan’s leaders often derived more legitimacy from external 
sources, and this complicated their ability to form institutions and extend state authority 
where other groups derived more internal legitimacy.  South Sudan demonstrates that 
legitimacy can be lost swiftly and entirely through the actions of leaders themselves, 
particularly when leaders place their own interests well above those of the other citizens 
of the state and resort to illegitimate violence to project or hold onto power.   
Both cases show that legitimacy is a commodity that leaders and the parties they lead 
‘and are turn led by’ can ill afford to lose if they hope to build a state, and more so if they 
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hope to keep the state such as it is from reverting to armed conflict.  Each case also 
demonstrates that the actions of key external actors, particularly neighbours and 
influential donors, can have a considerable impact on how leaders and the governing 
party are able to build a state following the end of conflict.  Above all, each case 
demonstrates that legitimacy of leaders is necessary, but not sufficient to build a state.  
The other aspects identified by theories of state building, namely coercion (or security 
and rule of law) and capital (public finances) are also necessary. 
Case Study – Mozambique 
One party – FRELIMO – has governed Mozambique since its independence in 1975.  
FRELIMO governed as a single-party state under a Marxist-Leninist ideology from 1975 
to 1989, during which the party had only two leaders who also served as President of the 
country – Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano.  In 1989 the party eschewed Marxist-
Leninism and changed the country’s constitution to allow for multi-party electoral 
democracy.  This preceded a peace agreement with an armed group who had dogged 
statebuilding since the late 1970s – RENAMO – that was eventually finalised in 1992.  
Following a short transition period, where Mozambique hosted a UN peacekeeping 
mission to assist implement the peace agreement, Mozambique has been a democracy 
since 1994 when elections were held for the first time in Mozambique’s history.  Since 
then FRELIMO has not lost a national election or the majority in parliament and has had 
a further two leaders – Armando Guebuza and Filipe Nyusi.  In 2012 RENAMO’s leader 
since 1980, Afonso Dhlakama, frustrated at RENAMO’s inability to make a difference 
through the ballot box ‘returned to the jungle’.  Over the past four years RENAMO has 
returned to its pre-peace agreement use of violence to pressure FRELIMO for 
concessions. 
The following case study will consider the interaction between leaders and their parties 
through two periods of post-conflict statebuilding in Mozambique, each ushered in via a 
negotiated peace agreement.  The first period is that following the 1974 Lusaka 
Agreement between the Government of Portugal and FRELIMO that gave Mozambique 
its independence and handed power directly to FRELIMO.  The second period is that 
following the 1992 General Peace Agreement (or Rome Agreement) that ended the 
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‘destabilisation war’ waged between government forces and the rebel group that had 
initially been created by Rhodesia and subsequently nurtured by apartheid-era South 
Africa to undermine FRELIMO’s efforts to build a stable independent state. 
FRELIMO handed power – Lusaka Agreement 
On 24 April 1974 the Carnation Revolution led by the left-leaning young officers of the 
Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) ousted the Caetano regime in Lisbon and ended 
Portugal’s colonial policies in Africa.  Local Portuguese military leaders from MFA in 
Mozambique recommended that Lisbon immediately recognise liberation movement 
FRELIMO as the legitimate representatives of the Mozambican people (Pinto 2003, 24).  
On 7 September 1974 the new government of Portugal and FRELIMO signed the Lusaka 
Agreement that called for the ‘progressive transfer of power’ from Portugal under a 
transitional government headed by FRELIMO ahead of full independence on 25 June 
1975 (the founding date of FRELIMO) (American Society of International Law 1974).  
FRELIMO had not won the liberation war that it had waged against the Portuguese 
colonists since 1964, but rather Portugal saw FRELIMO taking power as the only 
realistic path for the rapid decolonisation of Mozambique that Portugal’s new regime 
desired.   
The new President of Portugal, Antonio de Spinola, had initially offered FRELIMO a 
ceasefire, and proposed a long process of ‘self-determination’, which he said should not 
be confused with ‘independence’.  He said there could eventually be an independence 
referendum, but it would not be ‘fair’ to have one yet as the people were not sufficiently 
educated to decide their own future (Hanlon 1984, 43).  On 5 and 6 July 1974 the Foreign 
Minister of Portugal, Mario Soares, and the head of FRELIMO, Samora Machel, met in 
Lusaka.  While Soares only had authority to negotiate a ceasefire, Machel had three 
conditions: recognition of FRELIMO as the sole legitimate representative of 
Mozambican society; independence; and the swift transfer of power (Pinto 2003, 25).  
The talks collapsed. 
A proliferation of political parties and movements had emerged in Mozambique in the 
wake of the Carnation Revolution – mainly representing white Portuguese interests – and 
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in preparation for a referendum.  A small number formed to represent black 
Mozambicans who opposed FRELIMO, but collapsed almost immediately owing to 
leadership disputes (Hanlon 1984).  A referendum was never held.  Following the 
collapse of the July talks there were further meetings between MFA delegations and 
FRELIMO in Rome and then in Dar es Salaam.  As the Portuguese government shifted to 
the left the MFA finally overrode Spinola and agreed to Mozambique’s independence in 
talks in Lusaka on 7 September 1974 (Hanlon 1984).  Under the agreement FRELIMO 
was to nominate a Transitional Prime Minister and appointed Joaquim Chissano to the 
role.  The Lusaka Agreements did not cover social or economic affairs, but rather 
determined the Transitional Government should decide these. 
It is worth reflecting briefly on how FRELIMO had come to be considered the obvious 
entity for the new Portuguese administration to hand the nation, particularly as the 
Lusaka Agreement did not make any provision for political contest or popular 
consultation on the nature of government in the newly independent Mozambique.  As of 
June 1975 FRELIMO would govern as a single party state. 
FRELIMO emerged from the pan-African independence movements in the early 1960s.  
Frustrated by limited employment and education opportunities under discriminatory 
colonial policies, many young Mozambicans had moved to neighbouring countries 
particularly Tanganyika, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that by the late 
1950s were moving toward independence.  The Tanganyika African National Union 
(TANU) led by Julius Nyerere was outlining pan-African philosophies based on African 
nationalism, collectivism and socialism (Kaufman 1999).  Portugal opposed Mozambican 
independence with overwhelming force.  On 16 June 1960 Portuguese soldiers killed an 
estimated 600 protestors in the northern town of Mueda.  According to Hanlon: ‘the 
Mueda massacre showed more clearly than any other single event that the peaceful 
transition to independence taking place in neighbouring Tanganyika and elsewhere in 
Africa was not possible in Mozambique’ (Hanlon 1984, 24). 
A number of Mozambican liberation movements formed following the massacre, such as 
MANU, in Tanganyika modeled on TANU (Hanlon 1984, Newitt 1995), UDENAMO in 
Southern Rhodesia and UNAMI in Nyasaland.  Exile groups in Lisbon and Paris were 
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also active.  In the south of Mozambique there were strikes by dockworkers and nurses 
and radical student groups also started to form, despite a ban on political activities.  The 
most notable of these was the Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students that included 
FRELIMO’s first leader Eduardo Mondlane, and third and fourth leaders Joaquim 
Chissano and Armando Guebuza (Hanlon 1984).   
MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI moved their headquarters to Dar es Salaam following 
Tanganyika’s independence in December 1961.  The newly independent President of 
Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, encouraged them to merge (Hanlon 1984).  On 25 June 1962 
they came together to form the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique - FRELIMO), which held its First Congress in September 
that year.  The first leadership cadre of FRELIMO elected was Eduardo Mondlane as 
President, with Uria Simango of MANU Vice-President and formerly Paris-based 
Marcelino dos Santos Secretary for External Relations.  Nyerere allowed FRELIMO to 
use Tanzania as a base (Hanlon 1984, 25).  The First Congress discussed the possibility 
of military action in support of liberation and a group – including future leader of 
FRELIMO Samora Machel – was sent to Algeria in January 1963 for military training. 
The first years of FRELIMO were ‘marked by infighting, intrigues, purges, and 
defections’ (Hanlon 1984, 25), as FRELIMO remained a loose grouping of exile 
organisations which distrusted each other and were allegedly infiltrated by Portuguese 
intelligence.  Within three years, most of the founding members of FRELIMO had left.  
Following the start of military conflict with Portuguese forces in September 1964, those 
who remained in the Front disagreed over both military and political goals (see Hanlon 
1984, 28-32).  This was further exacerbated once FRELIMO achieved some military 
success in the northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, and leadership disputes 
shifted toward how to administer these newly liberated zones.  FRELIMO needed to 
decide what sort of ‘government’ it wanted to be, and so its leaders needed to decide 
what sort of direction they ultimately wanted Mozambique to develop in, what sort of 
state they ultimately wanted to build.  Samora Machel, who had taken over as head of the 
military in 1966, admitted that between 1967 and 1969 the leadership of FRELIMO was 
virtually ‘paralysed’ by disputes (Hanlon 1984, 27). 
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These debates were at the core of FRELIMO’s Second Congress in July 1968.  
FRELIMO was roughly divided between those who favoured a more nationalist approach 
to independence that still allowed for preservation of some of the traditional social 
structures (i.e. the rule of local chiefs) and economic structures of the colonial period (i.e. 
private ownership under a more locally controlled form of capitalism); and a group 
pushing a more disruptive, radical approach along socialist precepts (Saul 2005).  The 
radical group won out, particularly following boycotts of the Congress by key leaders 
from the conservative side (Hanlon 1984, 32).   
On 3 February 1969 the first leader of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, was killed when 
he opened a parcel bomb sent to his house in Dar es Salaam by agents of the Portuguese 
Secret Service (PIDE) in collaboration with some FRELIMO insiders (Munslow 1988).  
Vice-President of FRELIMO Simango a key proponent of the conservative side of the 
party saw himself as the natural replacement for Mondlane, but this was opposed by the 
more radical wing, mainly in the military operating in the liberated zones (Munslow 
1988).  At a meeting of the Central Committee held in April 1969 Simango was 
prevented from replacing Mondlane, and instead a presidential council was formed, 
representing a triumvirate leadership of Simango, Machel (head of the army) and 
Marcelino dos Santos (considered the leading revolutionary intellectual within the 
movement).  ‘The radicals argued that succession was not automatic and this finally won 
the day.  Simango, who was opposed to the increasing radicalisation of the movement, 
was isolated and the left effectively took power’ (Munslow 1988, 24-25).  In May 1970 at 
the following meeting of the Central Committee, Machel was declared President, dos 
Santos Vice President and in various accounts Simango was either expelled (Munslow 
1988) or resigned (Hanlon 1984) from the movement.  Simango became a vocal critic of 
FRELIMO and was ultimately executed for treason several years after independence. 
The leadership transition from Mondlane to Machel saw the end of the conservative 
faction of FRELIMO, but it also began the persistent perception that FRELIMO was a 
‘southern’ party – as most of its leaders came from the southern provinces of Gaza and 
Maputo, whereas those who had left were primarily from central and northern provinces.  
While of little consequence at the time as FRELIMO had gained popularity in the north 
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from its liberation of the northernmost provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, eventually 
this ‘southern bias’ would become a rallying point for RENAMO.   
Those who remained in FRELIMO’s leadership were united in their political and military 
goals, and since 1970 the overall leadership cadre of FRELIMO has remained remarkably 
stable.  Membership of the political bureau hardly changed from 1970 through to the 
early 1990s.  The nature of FRELIMO’s first leadership succession set a form of 
precedent for future transitions, such that no one should expect to become leader simply 
because of their position in the party hierarchy.  The party would always decide the next 
leader and no individual should make assumptions.  The party even went so far as to 
eliminate the position of Vice-President at its Third Congress in 1977.  In an interview 
with Munslow in 1987 Armando Guebuza explained FRELIMO eliminated the position 
of Vice-President ‘deliberately to prevent a clear hierarchy of succession being presented 
to the outside world’ (Munslow 1988, 25). 
FRELIMO’s only serious rival since the 1960s was COREMO, a small party which had 
attracted a number of FRELIMO dissidents, and in 1974 FRELIMO secured Portugal’s 
agreement that COREMO be excluded from the Lusaka negotiations (Pinto 2003).  In the 
end FRELIMO was handed power in the Lusaka Agreement owing to a combination of 
factors: the new MFA-backed administration largely shared its leftist world view; and 
above all, Portugal wanted to rid itself of the colony and FRELIMO was the only credible 
political and military entity positioned to govern.   
Building a state from modest start with modest means 
Statebuilding following conflict requires rebuilding the most fundamental institutions of 
state, whilst also addressing the key weaknesses that led to conflict in the first place.  
When institutions are weak or lacking, Weber (1947) considers that ‘charismatic’ leaders 
can substitute for other institutions of state, such as national bureaucracies.  Such 
substitution is most keenly required in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction 
when those needed to deliver the most basic services, rebuild damaged infrastructure and 
provide a sense of security are absent or themselves rebuilding.  This is when leaders step 
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forward to engage with international partners to assist, to decide national priorities and to 
reassure a war-weary population that it can start to rebuild with some sense of security.   
As Call and Wyeth (2008) noted, there are three aspects to state consolidation following 
the end of conflict, with charisma or legitimacy being only one of them.  The others are 
restoring or establishing security and law and order, and restoring or establishing public 
finances.  The decisions of leaders, and the institutions they rely on to support their 
decision-making, such as their political party are critical to these functions.  
Reconstruction following civil conflicts in particular poses specific problems for leaders, 
as they will need to project state authority into areas that were previously under control of 
their opponent, to unite possibly geographically and ethnically diverse populations, and 
to perform the sensitive tasks of disarming and demobilising armed groups and the 
related equally fraught task of reforming the security sector in order to reduce a post-
conflict army and reintegrate former combatants from all sides.   
When FRELIMO took over governance of an independent Mozambique the bulk of the 
country had never lived in a FRELIMO ‘liberated zone’ and thus had no experience of 
FRELIMO’s policies or governing philosophies.  It also meant that very few parts of 
Mozambique had FRELIMO cadre ready to deploy to implement these policies.  
Likewise, FRELIMO’s limited experience of governing small parts of the country had ill-
prepared it for the challenges of projecting state authority throughout the territory, let 
alone bringing rapid reconstruction and relief to the war-affected country, let alone doing 
all the above through its preferred governing ideology of radical, disruptive Marxism-
Leninism, which it formally declared as the governing philosophy in 1977 (Ottaway 
1988). 
The state FRELIMO was handed by Portugal in June 1975 was weak even compared to 
other former colonies in Africa, and further weakened by a decade of conflict.  Upon 
independence in 1975 Mozambique was one of the poorest countries in the world, ‘not 
because it lacked natural resources, nor because colonial power Portugal left it 
underdeveloped, but rather because Portugal actively underdeveloped it’ (Hanlon 1984, 
22).  Even by the standards of colonial rule elsewhere in Africa, Mozambique was a 
‘uniquely fragile creation’ (Vines 1991, 7).  Despite Portugal’s claim to have been the 
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occupying power since 1498, Mozambique was only administered as a single territory 
between 1941-1974.  Prior to this the most productive parts of the country were owned by 
chartered companies (Hanlon 1984, 16) and administered from head offices in Lisbon, 
London, Paris, Monaco, Brussels and Durban (Vines 1991).  The only major 
infrastructure built during this period was to support transport from Mozambique’s 
strategic ports to inland destinations in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Malawi.  So major 
road and rail in a country 1,800 kilometres long and on average 500 kilometres wide, ran 
east to west rather than north to south.  Most of the very limited internal infrastructure 
that FRELIMO inherited in 1975 was built by Portugal in the early 1970s in response to 
the liberation war (Vines 1991).  The importance of these transport links for landlocked 
neighbours, particularly Zimbabwe, is an explanatory factor for their interest in at times 
either destabilising or supporting their newly independent neighbour. 
As the Portuguese had never required an educated local workforce, colonial authorities 
never focused on education for native Mozambicans.  At independence 97 per cent of the 
population was considered illiterate and there were only 40 black Mozambicans enrolled 
at university (Mario and Nandja 2006).  The literacy rate was unchanged from 1950 when 
UNESCO estimated the adult literacy rate was 3 per cent, compared to around 12 per cent 
in British Nigeria, 22 per cent in Portuguese Cape Verde, 28 per cent in British Uganda 
and 52 per cent in French Mauritius (UNESCO 2006).  Today literacy rates in 
Mozambique are still relatively low at 58.8 per cent (CIA World Factbook 2016). 
Upon independence FRELIMO embarked on an ambitious series of programs and 
reforms.  In the month following independence the FRELIMO government, headed by 
President Samora Machel, nationalised law, medicine, education and funeral services, as 
well as land and rented properties (Hanlon 1984, 46).  FRELIMO’s efforts in education 
and health were particularly popular and use of these services jumped.  Primary school 
enrolments doubled in the first year.  FRELIMO also set out on a series of mass literacy 
campaigns that saw literacy rates climb from 3 per cent in 1974 to 28 per cent in 1982 
(Mario and Nandja 2006).  Government expenditure on health per capita grew from 
US$1.5 at independence in 1975 to US$4.7 in 1982 (Marshall 1990, 39) as the 
government set up health clinics throughout the country. 
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The flight of white Portuguese upon independence hit the economy hard, as their 
departure saw the exit of skills, capital and jobs.  FRELIMO responded to the crumbling 
of the colonial societal structures and its lack of cadre throughout the country by forming 
small ad hoc committees in villages, urban neighbourhoods and workplaces known as 
Grupos Dinamizadores (Dynamising Groups or GDs).  In many ways the GDs introduced 
Mozambique to FRELIMO and to ‘people’s democracy’, as well as kept the country 
running (Hanlon 1984). 
A key focus of FRELIMO economic policy in the early years of independence was 
agriculture.  FRELIMO recognised the need to prioritise projects that developed 
agriculture and improved the lives of the peasant population, as agriculture comprised 
around 80 per cent of the economy, with over 90 per cent of the population working in 
either plantations or subsistence farming (Ottaway 1988).  FRELIMO’s policy focused on 
two aspects: managing the former Portuguese plantations as state farms and creating 
collective communal villages (Ottaway 1988).  Ottaway estimates that by the end of 1981 
the state farms covered only 350,000 acres but consumed virtually the entire budget for 
agriculture and produced only 25 per cent of total agricultural output.  The communal 
villages reached only around 18 per cent of the rural population by the early 1980s and 
close to two thirds of these were in former liberated zones, so were probably already in 
place before independence (Ottaway 1988).  This policy was soon considered misguided 
and by 1983 was considered a failure, as the agriculture sector slipped further into 
subsistence and a drought moved Mozambique into a food crisis and famine. 
FRELIMO’s attempts at big initiatives in this period saw further failures, including the 
1983 launch of notorious Operation Production, overseen by then Minister for Interior 
Armando Guebuza.  The purpose of Operation Production was to move ‘unproductive’ 
people from the streets of Maputo and Beira to work in the underpopulated rural province 
of Niassa.  It started out as a voluntary system in June 1983 whereby unemployed could 
register to be moved by the government, but after only two weeks became a government 
operation of rounding up anyone lacking the correct paperwork that demonstrated they 
were employed and shipping them to Niassa in the middle of winter.  Apart from the 
huge cost to the government, and the lack of resources given to those moved who lacked 
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agricultural experience or social connections in the new province, Operation Production 
was also open to huge abuse.  Only two months after it started, President Samora Machel 
recognised the damage Operation Production was doing to FRELIMO’s reputation and 
popularity and ended the program.  Apart from being an embarrassing policy failure and 
constituting human rights abuses, it ended up being a huge diversion of government funds 
at the height of the worst economic crisis since independence (Mosse 2004). 
FRELIMO’s early efforts at state building had not resulted in either a stronger state or in 
increased opportunities for ordinary Mozambicans who largely saw little change in their 
day-to-day lives from colonial times.  From 1975 to 1983 a number of political and 
economic policy errors by FRELIMO, in combination with external security interference 
in the form of RENAMO, led to a significant economic crisis whereby the government 
was effectively bankrupt in the face of massive food insecurity as the country entered a 
drought and subsequent famine.   
The Rise of RENAMO – destabilising an already weak state 
The weakness of the newly independent state was exacerbated by developments in the 
region.  In March 1976 Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia and implemented 
UN sanctions, which according to UN estimates cost Mozambique in the order of 
£250 million (Hanlon 1984, 51).  Rhodesia retaliated with military attacks.  Independent 
Mozambique was also hosting Zimbabwean rebel group ZANU, which Rhodesia 
responded to by establishing a group ‘to sabotage, to disrupt the population and to disrupt 
the economy’ of independent Mozambique (Vines 1991, 16).  The group was known as 
the MNR or more commonly its Portuguese acronym RNM or RENAMO (Resistencia 
Nacional Moçambicana).  After Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 management of 
RENAMO shifted to the security services of apartheid-era South Africa, who saw 
destabilising Marxist-Mozambique as a key part of its ‘Total Strategy’ to limit the 
capacity of its neighbours to threaten its apartheid policies, which included retaliation for 
Mozambique’s hosting of African National Congress (ANC) and South African 
Communist Party members (Chan 2011).  South Africa proved to be a more effective 
supporter of RENAMO, who increased in effectiveness under South African tutelage and 
material support.  The Mozambican army was ill equipped to neutralise the threat from 
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RENAMO partly because of RENAMO’s terrorist tactics, and partly because structurally 
the national army had effectively ‘failed to make the transition from a network of 
scattered guerrilla units into a professional, capable armed force’ (Maier 1987). 
RENAMO focused its efforts on domestic terrorism – targeting in particular the symbols 
and extension of state power, namely health clinics and schools.  Between 1980 and 
February 1988 RENAMO’s efforts rendered inoperable approximately 1,800 schools, 
720 health units, 900 shops and 1,300 trucks and buses (Vines 1991, 17).  This ruthless 
destruction of schools and health posts meant that FRELIMO's post-revolutionary gains 
had been largely written off by the mid-to late 1980s (Alden and Simpson 1993).  It was 
one of the earliest armed groups to use child soldiers.  Chan describes RENAMO’s 
modus operandi as ‘a village-by-random-village series of mini-spectacles to drum fear 
into people and to make them petrified of supporting the government’ (Chan 2011, 38).  
It is estimated that tens of thousands died from direct violence in the conflict, and if 
conflict-related famine is taken into account then the US State Department estimated the 
number of Mozambicans killed as a result of RENAMO’s destabilisation approached 
100,000 (Vines 1991, 17).  By 1989 over a third of the population was displaced 
internally or externally – over 4.3 million people out of a population of 13.3 million.  
Apart from the security impact, from 1980 the fight against RENAMO had a precipitous 
effect on Mozambique’s economy.  Mozambique’s Gross National Product dropped from 
71,100 million meticais at independence to 55,600 million meticais in 1984 (following a 
small peak of 83,700 million meticais in 1981).  Adjusted for inflation (or in this case 
deflation), the GNP of Mozambique dropped 21 per cent from 1982 to 1983 alone 
(Marshall 1990, 35). 
From the outset RENAMO lacked legitimacy within Mozambique.  During the 1980s 
within Mozambique RENAMO was most often referred to as the ‘Bandidos Armados’ 
(Armed Bandits), which reflected the relationship most Mozambicans had to the group – 
as victims of its acts of violence.  The FRELIMO government painted the group as not a 
legitimate rebellion fighting a civil war, but rather as ‘a group of South African 
surrogates committing atrocities in pursuit of blind acts of terrorism purely for 
destabilisation lacking in any strategic objective, except to hinder Mozambique’s 
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development and keeping it as a weak state subservient to South African interests’ (Vines 
1991, 73).  In the early 1980s its support within Mozambique was often limited to the 
surrounds of its bases, particularly in Sofala province, where it had either intimidated or 
co-opted surrounding areas to provide support.  But by the late 1980s it had bases in nine 
of the 11 provinces and tried to project itself as the only champion for democracy in 
Mozambique (Vines 2013).  
Since its inception in 1977 RENAMO has only had two leaders.  RENAMO’s first leader 
was Andre Matsangaissa, a former FRELIMO field commander who had escaped from a 
FRELIMO ‘re-education camp’ where he had been sent for theft, who fled to Rhodesia to 
join the rebels.  He was given leadership of the group by Rhodesian intelligence in mid-
1977, and by October 1979 had been killed in fighting in Gorongosa in Sofala province 
(Vines 1991).  His death precipitated a power struggle within RENAMO between his 
deputy, Afonso Dhlakama, and candidates more favoured by its Rhodesian backers.  
Dhlakama was considered unpopular with the Rhodesians and with many black 
Mozambican dissidents.  His support derived almost entirely from the N’dau speakers of 
central Mozambique and from a number of powerful white Portuguese with close links to 
South African intelligence (Vines 1991).  The challenges to his leadership gradually 
resolved themselves with ‘the mysterious disappearance’ of Dhlakama’s main 
challengers, and a gunfight where Dhlakama killed another.  Matsangaissa’s death was 
shortly followed by the unilateral declaration of independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, 
which saw the end of Rhodesia’s support for RENAMO.  In 1980 Dhlakama admitted 
that ‘when Andre died the MNR was on the road to total destruction’ because of the 
power struggle (Vines 1991).  Vines observes that ‘RENAMO was only saved from being 
a sporadic irritant of armed banditry within Mozambique by the increased interest of the 
South African armed forces in maintaining it as a viable force’ (Vines 1991, 17). 
As with FRELIMO’s early leadership transition, RENAMO’s first change of leadership 
set a formula by which future leadership challenges would be met.  Namely, Dhlakama 
has been leader of RENAMO since 1980 and in the last 37 years has never brooked any 
subsequent challenge to his leadership.  At the relatively young age of 64 he is unlikely to 
step down of his own accord.  While no dissident from FRELIMO has split to set up his 
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or her own political party in the democratic era, this has happened twice to RENAMO.  
The second ranked leader Raul Domingos set up his own party after being kicked out by 
party leader Afonso Dhlakama in 2000 and Daviz Simango, RENAMO Mayor of Beira 
and son of FRELIMO dissident Uria Simango, formed the party that has become the 
consistent third force in national elections after being kicked out of RENAMO in 2008.   
At height of security and economic challenges FRELIMO’s leadership and cohesion is 
tested demonstrating the institution is more important than its individual leaders 
By the mid-1980s it would have been difficult to say that Mozambique was a successful 
post-conflict state.  Mozambique was wracked by drought, famine – some man-made 
owing to failed agricultural policies, some natural – and an increasingly effective internal 
destabilisation group supported explicitly, then covertly by apartheid South Africa.  
FRELIMO to its credit admitted to itself and the country that it had made early policy 
errors and sought to course-correct.  At its Fourth Congress in 1983 it assessed a range of 
evidence it had gathered and decided to revise its failing agricultural policies and also 
move toward more western-friendly economic settings in order to attract international 
support to help it through the famine.  It also restructured its membership structures to 
attract more party numbers, following a loss of members after its shift to more strict 
Marxist-Leninist structures post-1977 (Ottaway 1988).  In 1984 it joined the IMF and 
World Bank to access desperately needed foreign aid and credit (Bowen 1990). 
FRELIMO’s leaders sought to address the security situation.  In 1984 Mozambican and 
South African leaders signed the Nkomati Accord, which was intended to end South 
African support for RENAMO in exchange for the end of Mozambique hosting ANC 
members.  While Mozambique was seen to hold up its end of the agreement, it was 
discovered several years later (through papers found in a RENAMO base raided by 
Mozambican armed forces) that South Africa had continued its support (Vines 1991).  An 
indication of the success of FRELIMO’s attempts to steer the country out of its inter-
related economic and security crises through the Fourth Congress and the Nkomati 
Accords was President Samora Machel’s first official invitation to visit the United States 
in September 1985.  He met US President Ronald Reagan, who had previously seen 
Mozambique’s leaders as pro-Soviet communists and under the ‘Reagan Doctrine’ (see 
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US State Department Archive 2001-2009) his administration was known as supportive of 
RENAMO’s goals.  Reagan commended Machel’s ‘personal foresight and courage’ in 
engaging with South Africa and in engaging with international financial institutions – the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank – and committed US support to 
alleviate the impact of the drought (Reagan 1985).  For his part, Machel stated that 
Mozambique was an independent, non-aligned country, reiterated the importance of US 
support in ending Apartheid in South Africa, and thanked the US for its pledge of food 
and development assistance (Reagan 1985). 
Even though the economy was yet to turn the corner and the mid-1980s were the height 
of RENAMO activity, the efforts by FRELIMO and its leader Samora Machel to lead the 
country out of its difficulties were likely sources of optimism in many quarters.  Issues 
such as corruption, while an issue in the military, were not pervasive in the bureaucracy 
largely owing to Samora Machel’s personal example.  He had publicly shamed several 
senior bureaucrats found to be misusing public funds for private gain, and in 1986 was 
known to be planning a restructure of the military to deal with corruption around 
procurement.  He was considered an informal leader, able to relate to the broader 
population, but also as ‘such a powerful personality and forceful figurehead that he was 
literally seen as being FRELIMO – its core and personification’ (Munslow 1988). 
On 19 October 1986 President Samora Machel and 34 others were killed when their plane 
crashed in a remote area of South Africa near the Mozambique-Swaziland border.  
Machel and his entourage had been returning to Maputo from a summit in northern 
Zambia with the heads of state of Angola, Zaire and Zambia to discuss how to counter 
South Africa’s support for RENAMO.  Machel had headed home early from the Summit 
to convene a meeting of all senior members of the armed forces to discuss a 
reorganisation to root out corruption and increase its effectiveness against RENAMO 
(Munslow 1988).  That reorganisation never took place.  South Africa set up a board of 
inquiry into the crash, which blamed the deceased flight crew for flying off course.  
However, there have been persistent theories that the plane crash was an assassination 
orchestrated by South Africa (see Munslow 1988, Patta 1998) to demoralise and 
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destabilise Mozambique by removing a popular leader, as well as to prevent Machel’s 
reorganisation of the military.  
While Machel’s death was a devastating loss to Mozambique and FRELIMO, it did not 
serve the purpose of destabilising the country or the party.  In fact, the transition proved 
that FRELIMO as an institution was stronger than any individual leader, regardless of 
how much he may have embodied the movement.   
While international observers were bandying names around, including Marcelino dos 
Santos who was ranked number two in the Political Bureau, the Prime Minister Mario 
Machungo and popular party operative Armando Guebuza, within the Political Bureau of 
FRELIMO there was no major struggle for power (Munslow 1988).  No discussion of 
succession started within the Political Bureau until after Machel’s funeral was held on 
28 October 1986.  In its first meeting one member of the Political Bureau nominated 
Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano and all who were present assented; no other 
candidate was proposed (Munslow 1988).  The Central Committee accepted the 
recommendation of the Political Bureau when it next met and decided on the matter after 
only fifteen minutes.  Chissano became President of FRELIMO, and therefore President 
of Mozambique, on 3 November 1986 (United Press International 1986). 
According to long-time Mozambique observer, Barry Munslow, for astute observers of 
Mozambican politics Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique’s Foreign Minister and the number 
three in the Political Bureau, was the natural choice (Munslow 1988, 25).  As mentioned 
earlier, Chissano had been an active member of the student movement in Maputo, with 
Eduardo Mondlane.  After studying in Europe he joined FRELIMO in Tanzania and 
worked as secretary to Mondlane.  He was known to be close to Machel after spending 
time working with him in FRELIMO’s training camp in Kongwa in Tanzania (Munslow 
1988).  He eventually became chief representative of FRELIMO in Tanzania.  As already 
mentioned he was selected by FRELIMO to lead as Prime Minister the Transitional 
Government from September 1974 to June 1975.  Upon independence he became 
Mozambique’s first Foreign Minister. 
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While the leadership transition within FRELIMO was relatively smooth, and 
demonstrated that leaders drew their legitimacy from the party and not the other way 
around, the change from Machel to Chissano was significant.  Machel had been a 
powerful personality and a towering figurehead, who as the military leader of 
Mozambique’s liberation struggle was also seen to embody FRELIMO and its ideology.  
Chissano, as a long-time diplomat, was seen as more reserved, more formal with a ‘less 
direct and less personally expansive style’ (Munslow 1988).  Chissano encouraged 
devolution of power and responsibility across the party, and was committed to the 
method of collective leadership that operated within the Political Bureau (Munslow 1988).  
So while the style of individual leadership changed, with Chissano’s succession the 
overall decision-making style within the FRELIMO government did not.  Also, as key 
policy decisions are made at Party Congresses, Chissano would continue to lead 
implementation of the policies decided in 1983.  That the succession was accomplished 
so smoothly under such tragic circumstances is testament to FRELIMO’s unity.  
According to Munslow, this unity is a function of the nature of the collective leadership 
that developed within FRELIMO (Munslow 1988).  For Hanlon this unity derives from a 
strong commitment to consensus; a tendency to institutionalise conflicts and keep them 
within the party and ministries; and the ‘careful use of cadres and a commitment to give 
them another chance should they fail in one particular position’ (Hanlon 1984, 249).  
FRELIMO’s institutional structures allow for conflict, and also contain that conflict.   
Stage Two of Statebuilding – the General Peace Agreement or Rome Accords 
Under Chissano, FRELIMO state building efforts continued to move away from the strict 
Marxist-Leninist principles of centralised economic controls and planning and move 
toward more market-based, private-centric policies.  This process was accelerated by 
Mozambique’s acceptance of a series of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) starting 
in 1987 in response to receiving funding from the IMF and World Bank.  Amongst 
settings designed to open the economy to market forces and increase access to capital for 
the private the sector, the SAPs saw dramatic devaluation of the national currency; the 
removal of price controls on a number of commodities, which increased their supply but 
also substantially increased their cost; cuts to the public service and for those who 
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remained public service salaries, which almost immediately resulted in increased 
corruption as bureaucrats sought ways to supplement their reduced income; and cuts to 
farm subsidies and social services, including government spending in health and 
education (Bowen 1990, Marshall 1990).  At the macro level the SAPs resulted in some 
modest growth of Gross Domestic Product between 1987 and 1988, and benefits to a 
small group of traders, larger farmers and private entrepreneurs, but at the micro level the 
SAPs had a highly negative effect on the vast majority of Mozambique’s poor population.  
For example, the price of staple foods rice and maize increased at 575 and 317 per cent 
respectively between March and April 1988 and health spending per capita fell from 
$1.40 to $0.10 (it had peaked at $4.70 in 1982) (Marshall 1990).  While FRELIMO had 
agreed to the terms, from 1987 the IMF and World Bank in effect directed FRELIMO’s 
economic policy.  Scarce money continued to be spent on the military, as the 
destabilisation efforts of RENAMO continued.  Ultimately external actors had placed 
severe constraints on FRELIMO’s ability to self-govern while it was effectively at war 
(Bowen 1990, 217). 
FRELIMO’s leaders attempted to explain to an increasingly despondent population that 
the SAPs were a necessary remedy to restore Mozambique’s economic health and 
economic reforms had been in train since the 1983 Congress, prior to membership of the 
IMF and World Bank, and that the SAPs were of Mozambique’s making (Marshall 1990).  
Despite trying to show the government was in control, Mozambique had become 
dramatically dependent on foreign donors.  Economic policy rested with the IMF and 
World Bank and the UN’s Fund for Children (UNICEF) was more and more responsible 
for social policy (Marshall 1990).  By 1989, Mozambique was considered the most aid 
dependent country in the world (Alden and Simpson 1993).  The impact of the SAPs on 
ordinary Mozambicans dominated the FRELIMO rank-and-file debates in the lead up to 
the party’s Fifth Congress. 
Party Congresses have been central to institutional structures of the early stages of 
statebuilding as led by FRELIMO.  FRELIMO’s Fifth Congress in July 1989 can be 
considered the most significant in terms of setting up Mozambique’s second period of 
statebuilding.  At the Congress FRELIMO made several significant decisions.  The first 
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was to commit to seek an end to conflict with RENAMO.  The second was to officially 
cease Marxist-Leninism as the governing philosophy of the party and instead characterise 
FRELIMO as a ‘mass movement’.  The third decision was to replace the old political 
order and create a new constitution that would transform Mozambique from a single-
party autocracy to a multi-party democracy, with elections to be called in the next 
12 months (Alden and Simpson 1993).  In one fell swoop FRELIMO had appropriated 
what little political platform RENAMO had espoused and thus removed any political 
rationale for its continued fighting.  These decisions made in 1989 particularly on 
political structures fed directly into the content of the peace agreement with RENAMO 
and are still impacting the state of Mozambique today. 
The key personal challenge for Chissano’s leadership at the Fifth Congress was to 
convince the party to support the efforts he had already commenced to end the conflict 
with RENAMO (Bowen 1990).  At the start of 1988 Chissano had issued an amnesty for 
RENAMO fighters and pledged to let them take part in free elections if they renounce 
violence (Battersby 1988).  He extended the amnesty into 1989.  In 1988 Chissano 
secretly allowed Roman Catholic and Protestant bishops into Mozambique to sound out 
rebel representatives about their willingness to negotiate (Wren 1989), but stated publicly 
his government would not negotiate with the rebels.  On 12 September Chissano met with 
South African President PW Botha in the tiny town of Songo in Tete province at the 
Cabora Bassa dam – a major power source to Southern Africa whose power lines had 
been consistently attacked by RENAMO.  The leaders committed to strengthening 
economic ties and co-operation against RENAMO.  Unlike the Nkomati Accord, the 
Songo meeting did see the end of South African support to RENAMO.  Portugal (who 
still owned the dam) had earlier brokered a deal in June 1988 by which South Africa 
would loan Mozambique US$16 million to restore the power lines and pylons from the 
dam destroyed by RENAMO (Battersby 1988). 
One week prior to the Congress senior Mozambican Catholic and Anglican leaders met 
with RENAMO officials in Nairobi to present a FRELIMO position paper on ending the 
war (Bowen 1990).  The debate on peace that dominated the Fifth Congress focused on 
whether to legitimise a group that always been seen as armed bandits and terrorists.  In 
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the end the Congress agreed to support Chissano’s efforts to bring about a ‘dignified 
peace’ that does not ‘constitute a prize for terrorism’ (Wren 1989). 
RENAMO had held its own congress in June 1989 – the first in the movement’s history 
that brought together representatives from abroad and within Mozambique (Alden and 
Simpson 1993).  Dhlakama had called the conference to personally sweep clean the 
external wing of the organisation which was dominated by white Portuguese (which 
perpetuated the impression RENAMO was under foreign control) as he was ‘incensed by 
a history of incompetence, quarrelling, and general excesses by external representatives’ 
(Alden and Simpson 1993).  The Congress also elected provincial representatives, ‘giving 
the movement a national character beyond that of its ethnic N’dau origins’ (Alden and 
Simpson 1993).  These actions were significant as they represented preparatory moves in 
transforming RENAMO from a collection of guerrillas with its only political element 
being its skeletal and now excoriated external wing to that of a ‘politico-military 
organisation capable of participating in the complexities of peace talks’ (Alden and 
Simpson 1993). 
There were clear internal reasons for seeking peace.  Internally, the human and economic 
toll of ongoing fighting had become too much for FRELIMO’s leaders.  It was clear that 
the Mozambican army, even with external assistance, did not have the capacity to 
absolutely defeat the guerilla tactics of RENAMO.  Hence Chissano had been looking for 
solutions almost since taking over as President, alongside public condemnations of 
RENAMO atrocities.  Likewise, RENAMO was aware it was stuck in a stalemate and 
could not muster the forces or support to overthrow the FRELIMO government by force 
(Vines 2013).  According to Alden and Simpson, by 1989 ‘Mozambique had become 
perhaps the most outstanding example of the disintegration of a post-colonial state in 
Africa, and the process needed to be reversed’ (Alden and Simpson 1993, 117).  
Leaders from each side were again constrained by the actions of external actors.  The 
external dimension was to have the greatest impact on ending the conflict and setting 
Mozambique on its second phase of statebuilding.   
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Soviet Moscow had provided some support to FRELIMO both prior to independence and 
after it declared itself Marxist-Leninist in 1977.  However Moscow had detected pro-
Chinese Maoism in FRELIMO’s philosophy, and had been put off by Maputo’s refusal to 
host Soviet bases on Mozambican territory.  It was also aware of the strength of South 
Africa’s military and preferred to put resources into its weaker flank in Namibia and 
support the more pro-Soviet elements in Angola.  So this resulted in Moscow providing 
some limited military hardware in the early 1980s, but never committing the levels of 
military and political support that it did to Angola.  What little support it was providing 
wrapped up by the end of the Cold War and ceased in 1989 (Alden and Simpson 1993).   
The US administration had never officially endorsed RENAMO, despite it gaining the 
personal support of some influential US politicians.  This can be attributed to Samora 
Machel’s gradual move toward more independent foreign policy and pro-market outlook 
from 1983.  As noted earlier, Ronald Reagan had rewarded FRELIMO’s moves away 
from communism with food and development aid.  Right-wing supporters of RENAMO 
in the US distanced themselves from RENAMO after the international media focused on 
RENAMO atrocities such as a massacre in 1987 where it was alleged to have killed over 
400 civilians in a single town.  In reality, while affected by Cold War politics, it was the 
policies of neighbouring countries with respect to apartheid South Africa that had the 
greatest impact on Mozambique’s statebuilding. 
The United Kingdom, for its part, had been providing modest military training to 
Mozambican government forces in Zimbabwe since 1986.  The UK rationale for the 
training was to defend the transport corridors through Mozambique to allow the 
landlocked former British colonies – now Commonwealth member states – Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Malawi, and Swaziland to reduce their reliance on transporting through 
apartheid South Africa.  The UK also trained 10,000 Zimbabwean troops that stationed in 
Mozambique in the mid-to-late 1980s to protect the transport corridors through 
Mozambique to Zimbabwe from RENAMO attack (Maier 1987).   
Zimbabwe had been a staunch ally of FRELIMO since its own independence, but its 
intervention in its neighbour was estimating to be costing it Z$1 million a day from an 
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already weak economy.  As Zimbabwe gradually lost patience with the ongoing military 
stalemate it was also looking to find a path to peace (Alden and Simpson 1993). 
After a false start in 1989, when Zimbabwe and Kenya sought to mediate talks that 
collapsed when Dhlakama accused FRELIMO of trying to assassinate him, peace talks 
started in earnest in 1990 mediated by catholic lay organisation Sant’ Edigio in Rome (for 
full details of how Sant' Edigio came to be involved see Hume 1994).  Three rounds of 
talks were held in July, August and November of 1990 that resulted in a partial ceasefire 
along key trade corridors between Maputo and Beira ports and Zimbabwe in exchange 
for the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from these corridors.  As the talks were taking 
place the FRELIMO government unveiled the new Mozambican constitution which 
allowed for the introduction of a multi-party system, with regular elections on the basis of 
universal suffrage, guaranteed freedom of expression, of religion, and of the press, as 
well as the independence of the judiciary (Alden and Simpson 1993).  As Dhlakama 
himself admitted in 1991 ‘FRELIMO has started using all our lines - democracy, freedom 
of speech, freedom of worship’ (Alden and Simpson 1993). 
Early progress was quickly lost, as each side continued to use the military option to 
strengthen their hand in negotiations.  Beyond the constant breaches of the partial 
ceasefire, two other factors complicated negotiations.  The first was the clear difference 
in standard and sophistication between each side’s negotiators, with FRELIMO’s more 
polished and institutionally prepared team making RENAMO negotiators feel insecure 
and act defensively in talks.  This clear difference in institutional strength also led to the 
start of doubts for RENAMO as to whether it had the capacity to compete against 
FRELIMO in an open election, thus compelling it to maintain its military posture.  The 
second was the introduction of the new constitution, to which RENAMO had made no 
contribution, but had become the only template for a post-conflict political landscape.  
The new constitution was effectively presented to RENAMO as ‘the terms of its 
surrender’ (Alden and Simpson 1993). 
Mediators worked hard to maintain some momentum and by October 1991 progress was 
made on a number of key protocols that could form an eventual agreement.  Under the 
first protocol RENAMO agreed to conduct its struggle by political means in accordance 
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with existing Mozambican legislation – implicitly recognising the legitimacy of the state 
and its institutions – once a cease-fire was signed, while in return FRELIMO committed 
not to introduce any new laws.  The second protocol specifically exempted RENAMO 
from the constitutional requirement of obtaining one hundred signatures from each of the 
country's ten provinces in order to register as a political party.  It also guaranteed that 
RENAMO had access to the media, whilst reaffirming the Government's right to oversee 
the process of registering political parties.  A third protocol on election processes was 
under discussion, when RENAMO’s demand that the first task of any newly elected 
parliament be to review the Constitution – thus questioning the legitimacy of the 
Government’s legislation covered by the first two protocols – effectively derailed talks 
(Alden and Simpson 1993). 
Following a surprise meeting between Dhlakama and one of his key antagonists 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe in February 1992, RENAMO eventually signed 
the third protocol, but kept their military options open by refusing to set a timetable to 
negotiate a full ceasefire and future integration of RENAMO forces.  RENAMO knew it 
was unable to win the war militarily and yet, at the same time, it was fearful of competing 
at the ballot box and not gaining enough electoral support (Alden and Simpson 1993). 
While RENAMO continued to mount attacks, FRELIMO’s domestic political position 
deteriorated.  The impact of the SAPs was leading to increased popular opposition to the 
government, as prices and government corruption continued to soar, with shortages of 
key goods such as fuel, and the return of thousands of migrant workers from formerly 
Soviet Eastern Europe unable to be absorbed into the weak economy.  FRELIMO faced 
down an attempted military coup, which was interpreted as both an attempt by hardliners 
to resist the peace process with RENAMO, and a sign of the military’s anxiety at possible 
downsizing needed to absorb RENAMO fighters as part of an agreement (Alden and 
Simpson 1993). 
Throughout the talks RENAMO was caught on the horns of a dilemma.  The rebels faced 
the choice of playing according to the Government's new rules in the hope that they 
would do well at the ballot box, or boycotting the talks on the grounds that they had not 
been consulted during the shaping of the new political dispensation (Alden and Simpson 
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1993).  This has remained RENAMO’s dilemma since the first elections held in 1994.  
RENAMO’s leadership has continued to face difficulties abandoning the military option 
and committing to being entirely a civilian political party willing to operate within a 
constitutional legal framework not of its making.  By unilaterally adopting a new 
constitution, FRELIMO missed a crucial opportunity to enmesh RENAMO into the new 
political structure, thus denying them the ability to play an obstructionist role and 
complain they were being forced to play a game by rules that they had no say in devising. 
Eventually the dire circumstances facing Mozambique forced both sides to stop their 
various delaying tactics and reach an agreement.  The worst drought in 70 years saw over 
three million Mozambicans threatened with starvation and was the final straw that pushed 
both sides into signing an agreement.  According to Alden and Simpson: ‘Both sides may 
simply have come to the conclusion, given mass starvation, that there was a very real 
danger of there being no population over which to fight for control’ (Alden and Simpson 
1993, 126).  On 4 October 1992 the sides signed a peace agreement known as the General 
Peace Agreement or Rome Agreement. 
The key provisions of the Rome Agreement included holding multi-party elections in 
12 months, the formation of a national army of 30,000 to which each side would 
contribute half, with the excess soldiers going through a disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration program (DDR), and agreement that Dhlakama would be able to maintain a 
cohort of armed RENAMO troops as personal bodyguards.  The UN established a 
peacekeeping operation ONUMOZ to supervise preparations for elections and the DDR 
process.  Overall, ONUMOZ disarmed around 76,000 fighters, collected 155,000 
weapons, helped train soldiers in the new unified army (for detail on the DDR process see 
Alden 1995, Vines 2013), and helped some 5 million refugees and displaced persons 
return home (Jett 2016).  RENAMO breached the ceasefire early after signing the 
agreement and Dhlakama was counseled by the head of ONUMOZ, Aldo Ajello, who 
told him that there was no longer any benefit from him ‘showing his muscle’ as ‘now 
Mozambican people want to know if you also have wisdom’ (Vines 2013). 
After numerous delays Mozambique’s first democratic, multi-party national elections 
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were held from 27-29 October 1994.  Voter turnout was 88 per cent.  Joaquim Chissano 
won the Presidential election with 53.3 per cent of the vote, ahead of Afonso Dhlakama 
on 33.7 per cent.  The remaining 13 per cent was spread between ten other candidates.  In 
the parliamentary election FRELIMO formed a simple majority winning 129 of the 250 
seats, to RENAMO’s 112 seats (African Elections Database 2012).  Transformation of 
RENAMO into a political party was supported by a UN Trust Fund, which provided 
US$17 million to the former rebel movement ahead of the 1994 election (Vines 2013).  
The State Since 1994 – Questions of Legitimacy 
RENAMO’s election result demonstrated it had popular support across Mozambique, but 
not in Maputo where FRELIMO won convincingly.  This fed the historic and ongoing 
perception that FRELIMO was a ‘southern party’ and also reflected that most of those to 
have benefited most directly from FRELIMO’s government resided in Maputo and 
surrounds.  FRELIMO has continued its performance in Maputo in subsequent national 
elections.  Given its population relative to central and northern Mozambique, FRELIMO 
can maintain a national majority if it continues to hold the capital.  FRELIMO also 
continues to have the most sophisticated party machinery in Mozambique. 
This electoral lock, alongside the fact that FRELIMO remains the only party to have ever 
governed independent Mozambique has led to a confluence of the party with the state. 
This can be considered a ‘state capture’ by the political party such that few state 
institutions are not associated entirely with FRELIMO.  Some current diplomatic 
observers1 have commented that it is difficult to imagine what the ‘state’ even looks like 
without FRELIMO in charge.  The positive economic indicators and regularly scheduled 
elections have allowed external actors to ignore the centralisation of power in the hands 
of a small FRELIMO-linked elite and the lack of any reconciliation between FRELIMO 
and RENAMO which has led to continued distrust and resentment between the parties 
(Jett 2016).   
The only political space at the national level for any opposition in Mozambique is in the 
legislature, but Mozambique’s parliament has few resources, is not strong enough to act 																																																								1	Interview	with	a	western	diplomat	accredited	to	Mozambique.	
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as a check or balance on the power of the President, and every vote runs along party lines 
(Jett 2016).  Opposition parties (MDM and RENAMO) have increasingly made inroads at 
the municipal level, but local government has few resources at its disposal.  Provincial 
governors do have resources, but under the current constitution Provincial Governors are 
not elected, but rather are appointed by the Mozambican President. 
FRELIMO is also enmeshed in the economic life of Mozambique.  The relatively rapid 
move to private-market capitalism in a country as poor as Mozambique always posed the 
risk that those with power or access to power would be well-positioned to take full 
advantage of the dividends of peace likely to the detriment to the majority of 
Mozambicans.  This risk bore out, with high levels of institutional corruption associated 
with FRELIMO’s leaders.  The best example of this is Armando Guebuza – Minister for 
Transport from 1986 to 1999 – who by the time he became the leader of FRELIMO in 
2003 had become the richest man in Mozambique (Mosse 2004).  This continued to 
reflect that Mozambique’s most lucrative asset remained its ports that serviced its land-
locked neighbours – and the privatisation of port management had been profitable.   
Some argue that pressure and encouragement from international donors encouraged 
predation by the elite, but that this has slowly transformed to a more developmental 
model where the state is supporting larger businesses as a form of black Mozambican 
economic empowerment (Hanlon and Mosse 2010).  This approach has seen economic 
activity concentrated in the elite – effectively those with connections to FRELIMO – and 
international actors.  Corruption has also increased across the bureaucracy since 
liberalisation of the economy.  As noted, this was initially attributed to civil servants 
seeking to replace income from salary cuts associated with the SAPs.  Later following 
democratisation another relevant factor was the weakening of enforcement, as structures 
for monitoring bureaucrats and holding them accountable for their actions shifted from 
enforcement centred around the FRELIMO party to far weaker systems based on a 
developing rule of law under an independent judiciary and police force (Stasavage 1999).  
This is a further example of FRELIMO remaining institutionally stronger than many of 
the other institutions of state. 
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Residents of Maputo interviewed by Sumich in 2008 about their support for FRELIMO 
said that they appreciated the new freedoms and opportunities, and the end of shortages, 
but they also felt the democratic period had increased corruption and hardened the barrier 
between the elite (FRELIMO cadre) and middle classes (Sumich 2008, 111-112).  When 
asked if they would shift their support to RENAMO, they said no, ‘because the pockets 
of FRELIMO are already full, while RENAMO’s pockets are still empty’.  So a vote for 
RENAMO would be a vote for more corruption, as they were starting at the bottom and 
would need to catch up to reach FRELIMO’s current lifestyle (Sumich 2008).   
Sumich dismisses neo-patrimonial explanations for FRELIMO’s hold on power.  Rather 
he explains that the top ranks of FRELIMO and their families and close associates have, 
through the liberalisation that started in the mid-to-late 1980s, been able to expand from 
their political base into all facets of the economy.  It was those able to rise to positions of 
importance in the state bureaucracy under socialism that were best placed to take 
advantage of the liberal openings to amass wealth.  The power structure that this created 
was less clientalist or patrimonial with competing networks and more based on elite 
solidarity (Sumich 2008).  Even in the earliest days of independence FRELIMO had 
created an embryonic class system in Maputo based primarily on access to state power.  
Liberalisation and the SAPs were at their core designed to disentangle the party from the 
state.  However the process of liberalisation remained inherently political and the state 
remained the primary source and guarantor of the FRELIMO elite’s class power, and the 
government and the economy remain tightly interlinked.  In the words of a Mozambican 
from a politically connected family, ‘the difference between your country and mine is 
that in yours money buys you power, while here power buys you money’ (Sumich 2008, 
114). 
But post-conflict opportunities also affected one of the key architects of peace – Joaquim 
Chissano.  By the time Chissano reached the end of his term as FRELIMO President in 
2003, the Political Bureau opposed him running for the further term as party leader 
allowed in the Constitution.  This was because the political bureau believed he would 
lose the next election based on the perception in the party and the general population that 
he was personally corrupt and that he had overseen the growth of an endemic culture of 
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corruption in Mozambique over the twenty years of his leadership (Hanlon 2011).  
Chissano’s image was further tarnished in 2002 by allegations that his son (who died 
before the investigation was complete) had ordered the assassination of a journalist 
investigating state corruption in the privitisation of the country’s largest bank and 
allegations of money laundering (Mail & Guardian 2002).  His replacement as FRELIMO 
leader, Armando Guebuza, ran on a platform of cracking down on corruption and spent 
the year before the next national election touring the country building up national party 
structures.  Chissano remained influential in FRELIMO and actively campaigned for 
Guebuza who was hugely popular within FRELIMO (it is known that the two do not like 
each other) (Hanlon 2011).  So again a transition that could have split the party did not, 
as the importance of projecting unity externally was seen as paramount.  Evidence of the 
success of this approach can be seen in the international reaction to the transition.  
Chissano’s rejection by his own party – and likely rejection by the population – was seen 
internationally as statesmanlike.  Chissano won the inaugural Mo Ibrahim Prize for 
African Leadership for his decision to step down voluntarily from power and for leading 
Mozambique through its transition from conflict to peace (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2007). 
The liberalisation era and the move against Chissano also resulted in a shift in internal 
FRELIMO dynamics with the emergence of more obvious factions or ‘tendencies’ as 
they are referred to in the party (Sumich 2008).  Since democratisation party insiders 
refer to a ‘Chissano tendency’, a ‘Guebuza tendency’ a ‘Diogo tendency’ based around 
the Prime Minister Luisa Diogo and a ‘Machel tendency’ led by the widow of Samora 
Machel.  These factions became public in the selection of Guebuza’s replacement in 2014, 
a rare occurrence for a party that values the perception of unity (The Africa Report 2014) 
and persist in current FRELIMO politics.  Prominent party insiders have predicted that 
differences between these groups may in the future see FRELIMO split (Agencia de 
Informacao de Mocambique 2016).   
RENAMO’s relatively successful election result in 1994 reflected that, although 
RENAMO had been almost entirely reliant for most of its existence on external support, 
and its atrocities against civilians were well-documented, it was also able to garner a 
surprising level of support from a rural population who had not benefited from 
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FRELIMO’ efforts at statebuilding.  Through the 1980s it found support in those 
dispossessed by FRELIMO’s attempts at centralised agricultural planning in the early 
1980s, and those who resented the disruption to traditional ways of living brought about 
by FRELIMO’s Marxist-Leninist rejection of the Chieftaincy power structures (Pearce 
2016).  By the late 1980s RENAMO was also increasingly finding support from those put 
off by the increasingly high level of government corruption, including the predation from 
the incompetent, undertrained, underpaid government army, and hardships from the SAPs.   
RENAMO was able to repeat its relative election success in the 1999 national elections, 
where Dhlakama again went up against Chissano for President and garnered 47.7 per cent 
to Chissano’s 52.3 per cent.  In Parliament RENAMO became the sole opposition 
increasing its number of seats to 117, whereas FRELIMO increased its slim majority to 
133 seats.  At the next two elections RENAMO’s popularity took a dive.  In 2004 when 
Dhlakama ran against Guebuza for President he only gained 31.7 per cent of the vote (the 
FRELIMO candidate polled 63.7 per cent) and in 2009 this dropped to 16 per cent, losing 
votes to both Guebuza who polled 75 per cent and the former RENAMO Mayor of Beira 
Daviz Simango who gathered a respectable 9 per cent.  Its parliamentary results were 
even worse, winning only 90 seats to FRELIMO’s 160 in 2004 and 51 to FRELIMO’s 
191 in 2009 (African Elections Database 2012). 
RENAMO’s drop in electoral support can be attributed to a number of factors.  A key 
reason was RENAMO had never developed a cogent political platform beyond opposing 
FRELIMO.  Guebuza campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, basically saying he 
would bring the change to Mozambique that RENAMO was also trying to claim.  Also 
during Guebuza’s two terms Mozambique experienced impressive economic growth (for 
example an increase of 7.1 per cent in GDP in 2011), which had consolidated 
FRELIMO’s hold on power (Vines 2013).  Also as the war receded RENAMO was not 
able to build a professional political party structure that would allow it to translate its 
prior military strengths that were based on disparate geographic groupings under a 
limited hierarchy to political strengths.  But the most important factor seems to be 
Dhlakama’s leadership.  He never changed his style of leadership from the tight control 
he exerted during the war.  Dhlakama exerted personal control over all aspects of the 
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party and actively worked against setting up formal party structures – both because party 
organisation was ‘seen as a hangover from the bad socialist days’ (Hanlon 2011) and 
because Dhlakama refused to devolve power to party members.  At the two party 
congresses held since 1994 (in 1995 and 2001) Dhlakama made all appointments, rather 
than opening them to a party vote (Vines 2013).  He used to watch parliamentary sessions 
on television and call RENAMO members of the house with instructions during the 
session.  His personal approval was required for all their voting positions and RENAMO 
appointees in other state institutions (Hanlon 2011).  Any member of RENAMO seen as a 
challenge to his leadership – whether the popular Mayor of Beira Daviz Simango who he 
dismissed who then ran successfully as an independent, or his deputy Raul Domingos – 
were eliminated from the party.  Dhlakama has also regularly sought to remove decisions 
from parliament and seek to resolve them through bilateral discussions between the 
leaderships of the parties (Manning 2002a, Vines 2013).  Vines concludes: ‘The inability 
of Dhlakama to transform from an insecure, centralising guerrilla leader has contributed 
significantly to RENAMO’s rapid decline’ (Vines 2013, 385).  
By 2012 it was becoming clear that Guebuza’s anti-corruption push was a façade and he 
was likely worse than his predecessor and was leading a party that was the fastest avenue 
to making money in Mozambique.  In 2012 Transparency International ranked 
Mozambique 123 out of 176 countries in its perception of corruption index (Transparency 
International 2013).  By 2016 this rank had deteriorated to 142 out of 176 countries 
(Transparency International 2017).  A particular low-point was Wikileak cables released 
in 2010 that suggested Guebuza was protecting drug smugglers (afrol News 2010).  
FRELIMO’s lack of electoral accountability and capture of the state had seen it make 
poorer and poorer decisions with regard to public policy (see Agencia de Informacao de 
Mocambique 2016).  The liberation party was rapidly losing its governing legitimacy.   
Dhlakama responded to his own waning relevance and popularity by reverting to what he 
knew best and in mid-2012 he repudiated the 1992 Rome Agreement and ‘returned to the 
jungle’ (his wartime stronghold in Gorongosa) with the bodyguards he had been able to 
maintain as a private army.  Dhlakama was using force as his only bargaining chip with 
government, drawing on weapons caches in Gorongosa remaining from the limited DDR 
	 57	
process (see Reppell, Rozen, and de Carvalho 2016).  Dhlakama’s complaints included 
that only FRELIMO were benefiting from the country’s newly found wealth from recent 
coal and natural gas discoveries, it wanted more of its demobilised fighters included in 
security services, and electoral reform (Vines 2013).  Dhlakama claimed the government 
was no longer meeting the terms of the Rome Agreement where the security services 
were to be half FRELIMO and half RENAMO, as increasingly retired ex-RENAMO 
members were being replaced with government appointees.  RENAMO also wanted 
power to be devolved to the provinces, which would create a patronage base for 
RENAMO, and for that reason would be hard for FRELIMO to accept (Pearce 2016). 
Guebuza responded with force, rather than negotiation, precipitating a series of armed 
clashes over an 11-month between government and RENAMO forces, that saw several 
deaths and the closure at times of mines and major transport routes, in a ‘low-grade 
version’ of Mozambique’s earlier conflict (Jett 2016).  This played directly into 
RENAMO and Dhlakama’s military strengths and perversely restored a degree of 
RENAMO credibility and popularity.  RENAMO showed that while it did not have the 
capacity to return the country to war, it could still disrupt transport and economic activity 
and needed to be reckoned with.  The instability affected FRELIMO’s popularity as it 
was seen to be losing control of security and risking the Rome Agreement by seeking 
confrontation rather than negotiation with RENAMO (The Africa Report 2014).    
A truce was called to allow the 2014 national elections to go ahead.  Dhlakama garnered 
36.6 per cent of the vote to FRELIMO candidate Filipe Nyusi’s 57 per cent and gained a 
further 38 seats in parliament (Mozambique News Agency 2014).  While a huge 
improvement from the 16 per cent in 2009 Dhlakama had again lost.  He then threatened 
‘uncontrollable violence’ if FRELIMO did not negotiate with him (Masterson and 
Akinduro 2014).  His key post-election demand rested on changing the article of the 
constitution whereby the (FRELIMO) President names Provincial Governors to a system 
that reflects party performance at the election.  Since 2012, despite the brief truce for the 
elections, conflict with RENAMO forces has escalated.  In 2015 over 10,000 people 
sought refuge in Malawi, mainly as a result of actions by government forces against areas 
known to be RENAMO strongholds. 
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If the conflict itself resembles a ‘low-grade version’ of Mozambique’s civil war, in many 
ways so does the international mediation effort set up to resolve it.  The defacto chief 
mediator is the European Union’s Mario Raffaelli, who also mediated the Rome Accord.  
FRELIMO had been negotiating directly with RENAMO on and off since 2012, but had 
resisted RENAMO’s demand for foreign negotiators.  Eventually, President Nyusi 
softened FRELIMO’s position and agreed to an international mediation conducted by the 
EU, the Catholic Church and South African President Jacob Zuma (all three proposed by 
RENAMO).  For its part, FRELIMO added former Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, 
former Botswana President Ketumile Masire and a representative of mediating 
organisation Inter Mediate (Fabricius 2016).  Formal negotiations on a ceasefire and a 
decentralisation plan started in July 2016 and were suspended indefinitely three days later 
with each side holding a hard line:  Dhlakama refusing to cease fighting until his political 
demands were met, and FRELIMO’s refusing to relinquish power over the provinces 
under the pretext of any decentralisation process needing to follow the existing 
constitution (Fabricius 2016).   
Decentralisation is a deadly business.  Not only is it at the core of RENAMO’s current 
rationale for fighting, but in March 2015 a prominent constitutional law expert 
RENAMO had contracted to write a devolution proposal, Gilles Cistac, was shot dead in 
broad daylight outside a Maputo café (Hanlon 2015).  Cistac’s death underscored how far 
it seemed FRELIMO hardliners were prepared to go to avoid losing power in the 
provinces, and with it control over land use rights, and probably concessions for natural 
resources (Fabricius 2016).  Apart from the obvious loss of resources or patronage, the 
decentralisation debate also gets to the core of Mozambique’s statebuilding project.  A 
more compelling argument Nyusi has used to resist RENAMO’s demands is that 
decentralisation undermines Mozambique as a unitary state that since independence has 
successfully avoided being split along ethnic or language lines (Hanlon 2015).   
Dhlakama, while seeming to be pushing for a more democratic system of governance is 
‘far from being a federalist at heart himself’ (Fabricius 2016).  In the current negotiations 
he is insisting he personally should appoint the governors in six of the country’s 11 
provinces that he claims RENAMO ‘won’ at the 2014 election (Sofala, Zambezia, 
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Nampula, Tete, Manica and Niassa).  The claim of victory is itself dubious, as Dhlakama 
only won the majority of votes in Sofala and Zambezia; more votes than Nyusi (but not 
the majority) in Nampula, Tete and Manica; and lost to Nyusi in Niassa.  In the 
Parliamentary elections RENAMO did not win a majority in any province, though it won 
most votes in Sofala and Zambezia.  In local government elections RENAMO only won a 
majority of votes in Sofala, Zambezia and Tete.  In short, it is easy to see how FRELIMO 
interprets Dhlakama’s demands for decentralisation as a push to partition Mozambique 
into two parts – north and south of the Save River.  Mediators and legal experts have 
suggested decentralisation formulae based closer to actual election results that would rest 
on coalition arrangements intended to also foster cooperation between FRELIMO and 
RENAMO (or whichever party may win future elections), but Dhlakama has rejected 
these outright.  He has flatly rejected anything short of FRELIMO handing over the six 
provinces.  He said if this was not done ‘nicely’ he would just go back to war to get them 
(Fabricius 2016).  Dhlakama does not want real devolution as that would put power in the 
hands of elected RENAMO officials which they would use to challenge his absolute 
authority over the party (Hanlon 2015).  While there is mediation in place, given the 
seniority of many of the participants (some of whom like South Africa’s Zuma have their 
own domestic preoccuptions), it is difficult to see it taking the proactive role needed to 
make progress.  Above all, while Nyusi has shown some flexibility to negotiate with 
RENAMO, Dhlakama’s inability to transition from a guerilla mindset bodes ill for the 
current mediation process and a return to peace.   
Since 1992 weaknesses in the Rome Agreement, particularly relating to the imposition of 
a political system by FRELIMO, has given Dhlakama room to constantly question the 
democratic order.  This tendency increased once he felt that victory under what he 
considered a rigged system would always elude him.  Ready access to arms and fighters 
has meant Dhlakama has been able to keep the military option alive and disrupt 
Mozambique’s ongoing statebuilding project.  For its part, FRELIMO has squandered the 
peace dividends from the Rome Agreement.  Rampant corruption has seen FRELIMO 
elites benefit from high levels of economic growth, and increased dissatisfaction from 
those unable to access this elite, which has returned support to RENAMO. 
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Conclusions 
As outlined in Chapter One, the leadership theories of Keohane, Burns, Leftwich and 
Levy ultimately conclude that leaders matter.  Each scholar contributes to a theory of 
political leadership that both describes the unique organisational resources and legitimacy 
that leaders can draw upon, as well as the constraints on leaders from circumstance and 
context.  Focusing too much on the constraints can diminish the importance of individual 
decisions as an explanatory factor for how events unfold.  Likewise, focusing too much 
on the agency of individuals ignores the interaction between leaders and the context in 
which they lead.  All these scholars of leadership theory find a balance between these 
questions of structure and agency by focusing on the relationship between leaders and 
institutions, or as Keohane (2005) summarises: ‘leadership is empowered by institutions 
and popular support, but it also curbed by them’. 
This balance is starkly illustrated in the challenges leaders face building a state after the 
end of conflict.  Khadiagala (2006) poses the dilemma of leadership in post-conflict 
reconstruction ‘as that of strong personalities and weak governance institutions’.  He says, 
‘leaders that are grounded in institutions are particularly important in post-conflict 
reconstruction, but they are always in short supply because institutions are either weak or 
strong individuals frequently overwhelm these institutions’.  Khadiagala and Lyons 
observe the most successful cases of state reconstruction following civil war reveal 
leadership patterns of strong individuals operating within the constraints of organisations 
such as political parties or national/liberation movements (Khadiagala and Lyons 2006).   
The case study of Mozambique provides multiple points of comparison to illustrate 
aspects of these theories.  Within the one case this research has been able to compare two 
periods of statebuilding and the transition of two very different rebel groups to political 
party. 
The first period of statebuilding in Mozambique saw charismatic individuals leading a 
united FRELIMO embark on a project of national transformation that it was ill equipped 
to implement, in the face of natural disasters and man-made calamity designed by its 
powerful neighbours to ensure a weak state.  During this first period, when Weber (1947) 
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considered that charismatic leaders can substitute for other institutions of state, such as 
national bureaucracies, it was clear that not just individual leaders but the collective 
institution of FRELIMO attempted to make this substitution.  But it was always 
incomplete.  United national leadership – the charisma and legitimacy of Call and 
Wyeth’s three pillars of statebuilding – even with its ability to correct its erroneous public 
policies and overcome unexpected leadership transitions, could not substitute for the 
other statebuilding pillars of security and public finance.  Security was never possible 
with the well-funded external support to RENAMO even if FRELIMO had the resources 
to build a capable security sector.  Likewise, FRELIMO never had the resources to fund 
its vision of a centralised economy and after only a short period control of public finances 
was effectively handed over to external actors – the IMF, World Bank and powerful 
donors – seeing FRELIMO’s leadership priorities subjugated to their interests.  While 
FRELIMO’s collective decision-making was the norm, there were rare occasions during 
this period when individual leaders were ahead of the governing party on public policy.  
The most striking example of this was Chissano’s personal efforts to find peace with 
South Africa and RENAMO, and convince his party to back his approach at the Fifth 
Congress.  Despite his later corruption, his leadership ushered in Mozambique’s second 
period of statebuilding. 
The second period of statebuilding saw liberalisation and democratisation bring increased 
freedoms, but also rampant corruption.  FRELIMO proved incapable of ending its 
substitution of institutions of state.  While the purpose of the SAPs in the 1980s was to 
reduce the influence of the single party on the state by introducing greater economic 
decentralisation and market-based mechanisms, this never occurred to the extent 
envisaged by external actors.  FRELIMO was able to use its former dominance as a 
single party, with tight institutional structures that rewarded those close to the party, to 
consolidate its grip on most institutions of the newly democratic state and economy.  
Those institutions that it was not in control of, such as an independent judiciary, have 
proved to be weak constraints on FRELIMO’s power.  Its consistent victories at elections 
reinforced that it had no need to change its approach.  Regular elections and the 
maintenance of peace meant external actors were not putting pressure on FRELIMO’s 
leaders to change their approach.  Only recent scandals over government debt that was 
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hidden from external lenders has threatened Mozambique’s access to aid, which prior to 
2016 was seen as off-limits as leverage on FRELIMO to reform in order to avoid hurting 
ordinary Mozambicans.  FRELIMO party members are increasingly willing to show their 
disagreement in public and a number of high profile members are openly nostalgic for 
what they considered the corruption-free Machel years.  FRELIMO’s corruption has 
weakened both the symbolic and performance-based legitimacy of the party, whilst 
giving its increasingly armed opposition an opening to build its support.   
Over the same period RENAMO has been able to transform its externally derived 
legitimacy into internal legitimacy, but this remains more symbolic than performance-
based.  It is clear that its leader Afonso Dhlakama both embodies the party and limits its 
future prospects, as he has no desire for it to transform from a rebel group to a 
functioning political party.  It could be argued that FRELIMO made its transition from 
liberation/rebel movement at its Fourth Congress when it eschewed its hardline pre-
independence ideological approach and sought to identify how to address in practical 
terms the challenges the country faced.  It could equally be argued that RENAMO has 
never made the transition from rebel group to political party.  Dhlakama has actively 
prevented the demilitarisation of RENAMO that would enable its full transition, and has 
inserted his insecurity, paranoia, and rebel mindset of seeing all problems through a 
military lens, into its day-to-day running.  It is clear that Dhlakama never took up the 
head of ONUMOZ Aldo Ajello’s advice to show his wisdom rather than his muscle to the 
people of Mozambique.  His inability to transition from rebel leader to politician suggests 
that all his leadership offers Mozambique is more violence and a weaker state. 
The combination of FRELIMO’s corruption and decreasing legitimacy and RENAMO’s 
intransigence and preference for armed conflict bodes ill for Mozambique’s future 
stability.  The efforts of external actors to mediate between these two sides – even if they 
were sustained and at a necessarily high-level – will be insufficient if FRELIMO can not 
reform, including returning to its culture of unity, and improve its legitimacy with all 
Mozambicans, and if Dhlakama cannot move away from his preference for violence as a 
way of circumventing the institutions of democracy.  
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Chapter Four – Case Study – South Sudan 
On 9 July 2011 South Sudan declared its independence six months after a referendum 
wherein 98 percent of eligible Southern Sudanese voted for secession from Sudan.  This 
referendum was a key provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed 
between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) in January 2005 that ended the second Sudanese civil war that had persisted 
since 1983 (CPA 2005). 
The infant state of South Sudan went from independence to civil war in 28 months.  In 
December 2013 violence broke out in the capital Juba and quickly spread to the oil-
producing areas of South Sudan (the Greater Upper Nile States – Unity, Upper Nile and 
Jonglei).  The fighting had an ethnic character, as armed groups mainly comprised of the 
two largest ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Nuer, targeted each other and civilians in 
turn.  This violence soon turned into a civil war between security forces aligned with the 
current President of South Sudan and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), Salva Kiir (a Dinka), backed by Ugandan troops, against those 
aligned with his former Deputy President, Riek Machar (a Nuer), leading a group known 
as the SPLM-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO).  Violence eventually spread to other parts of 
South Sudan, such as Western Equatoria state.   
Since December 2013 over 15,000 South Sudanese have been killed in the civil war 
(ACLED 2016), over 2.1 million of an estimated population of 13 million people have 
been internally displaced and over 1.5 million have taken refuge in neighbouring 
countries (UNHCR 2017).  At the end of 2015 close to 3.9 million South Sudanese faced 
severe food insecurity (Panel of Experts on South Sudan 2016) and this number has risen 
to 4.9 million at the start of 2017 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations 2017).  On 20 February 2017 South Sudan declared a famine in parts of the 
country (The Guardian 2017), the first country to do so since Somalia in 2011.  
Transparency International ranks South Sudan 175 out of 176 countries in its perception 
of corruption index (only ahead of Somalia) (Transparency International 2017).  Inflation 
in South Sudan sits at around 800 per cent (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 2017).  The empirical state of South Sudan has effectively collapsed. 
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Earlier this report highlighted the dilemma posed by Khadiagala (2006) of leadership in 
post-conflict reconstruction ‘as that of strong personalities and weak governance 
institutions’.  He says, ‘leaders that are grounded in institutions are particularly important 
in post-conflict reconstruction, but they are always in short supply because institutions 
are either weak or strong individuals frequently overwhelm these institutions’.   
South Sudan is a case that proves that if there are weak leaders as well as weak 
institutions (Khadiagala 2014), then disaster is possible; as we witness the civil war in 
South Sudan enter its fourth year.  Despite being independent since July 2011 and self-
governing since January 2005 the leaders and governing party in South Sudan (the 
SPLM) have yet to transition from ‘rebel movement’ to civilian government.  This lack 
of a transition is at the core of the SPLM’s failure to have built the institutions of state 
that the World Bank Human Development Report (2011) highlighted are necessary to 
avert a return to conflict. 
Earlier this report noted Lyons’ (2016) conditions for the transition of a rebel group to a 
post-war government able to exert authority across a territory involved a powerful 
military institution transitioning to a powerful political institution.  The four causal 
mechanisms he identified for this transition are: 1) the levels of solidarity and leadership 
coherence characteristic of successful insurgent groups; 2) the precedents and 
organisational structures developed during wartime governance of liberated territory; 3) 
post-war legitimacy derived from military victory – “we rule because we won!”; and 4) 
the use of transitional processes, such as post-conflict elections, transitional justice, and 
demobilisation, as instruments of power consolidation.  It can be inferred that the extent 
to which each of these conditions is met would likely determine the degree of relative 
power of the post-war political institution and thus its ability to exert authority across its 
given territory.  In particular, when a conflict ends in negotiation rather than a victory, the 
post-war government needs to find an alternate source of governing legitimacy.  Rebel 
groups may be able to derive some short-term legitimacy when they are seen by the bulk 
of the population as ‘liberators’, even in a civil war scenario.  However, in order to be 
sustainable this symbolic legitimacy needs to be turned into performance-based 
legitimacy at early opportunities. 
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Looking at Lyons’ conditions for a successful transition, the SPLM in South Sudan meets 
very few of the conditions for a party able to exert its authority.  The SPLM/A was a 
weak military institution and it has transitioned into a weak political institution.  These 
weaknesses are evidenced in the splits and factions that have characterised the SPLM/A 
since its inception.  Organisationally, the transition has been difficult because at the time 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005 the political wing of the 
party was effectively one man – founding leader John Garang.  While he had a faction 
close to him who understood his views on the direction that a self-governing Southern 
Sudan should take, most of the top leadership of the SPLM were soldiers not politicians.  
When Garang died in a helicopter crash three weeks after the start of self-government on 
30 July 2005, it was the soldiers who took over.  The SPLM and its current leaders 
remain dominated by the military, and their efforts over the past decade seem more 
focused on overseeing a kleptocracy financed by oil revenues, than establishing 
institutions of state able to meet even the most basic needs of its people.   
Political institutions that support an effective one-party state have proved insufficient to 
contain elite rivalries and repair or accommodate earlier schisms in the ruling party.  
Sharp leadership divisions in the SPLM – that can be traced back to its inception – are 
key drivers of the civil war that broke out in December 2013.  The famine of 2017 is a 
man-made disaster.  It is difficult to find a single commentator on South Sudan who does 
not conclude that the current leaders of South Sudan have failed their people – 98 per 
cent of whom voted for independence from Sudan in the referendum of January 2011. 
While the SPLM gained legitimacy from being seen as the party that brought the option 
of independence to the people of South Sudan, it squandered the six-year interim period 
and soon after independence citizens were questioning what they had gained from 
independence, as there was no new infrastructure, or improvements in health or education.  
External actors – bilateral donors, and international and local non-government 
organisations – were providing some basic services that should be delivered by the state, 
and few citizans saw a peace dividend.  Perceptions of dominance of the SPLM by a 
Dinka majority made other ethnic groups question whether the governing party actually 
represented all South Sudanese.   
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Lastly, the SPLM made several blunders as it tried to use processes of transition to 
consolidate its power – particularly with regard to demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) of other combatants active in South Sudan.  Rather than experience 
any reform or demobilisation after the war, the SPLA grew from approximately 40,000 
veterans in 2004 to well over 200,000 by 2013 (de Waal and Mohammed 2014) and 
current and former SPLA dominated almost all facets of South Sudanese institutions 
(Pinaud 2015).  The loyalty of the newly integrated soldiers had been bought by the 
SPLM/A and could only be relied upon while payments were made.  Any attempt at 
reform of the security sector or post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation or 
reintegration of armed groups failed utterly (De Waal 2014). 
Unlike in Mozambique where FRELIMO’s efforts to create a strong state were 
consistently and effectively undermined by its neighbours, the SPLM’s inability to form a 
strong state can almost entirely be attributed internally to its leaders.  Neighbours 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have been supportive of South Sudan and through regional 
organisation IGAD have supported peace efforts since 1994.  The actions of Sudan and 
outstanding issues from the peace agreement of 2005 have certainly complicated South 
Sudan’s statebuilding effort, particularly in the tense six-month period between the 
referendum result for independence and the declaration of independence.  Following 
independence there were several moments when it seemed to observers that South Sudan 
would revert to war with Sudan – for example following South Sudan’s seizure of the 
Heglig oil field in April 2012 (Copnall 2012).  However the war that started in December 
2013 was an internal conflict with highly complex causes that can be traced to 
fundamental flaws in the SPLM as a political body able to negotiate internal power 
contests, a militarised state where ethnicity had been instrumentalised in support of 
political factions, and a rentier economy where the elite had plundered the considerable 
income from dwindling oil reserves and drew limited legitimacy from the citizenry of 
South Sudan.  All these factors have contributed to the development of weak institutions 
unable to constrain the actions of leaders and armed elites. 
Security tension with Sudan has meant that South Sudan has been able to justify a 
security posture that warrants increased militarisation, rather than any demobilisation or 
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disarmament of combatants.  Such demobilisation should have been a key element of 
asserting civilian control over the military, and redressing the imbalance between civilian 
and military institutions – a key priority for post-conflict statebuilding (Khadiagala 2006). 
Other external actors have played critical roles in statebuilding in South Sudan.  Apart 
from Sudan, other external actors have had a significant influence on both how the SPLM 
developed as a political party, and in recognising the SPLM as legitimate representatives 
of the aspirations of the people of southern Sudan.  Neighbouring countries, such as 
Ethiopia were critical in the formative years of the SPLM, and the United States was 
instrumental in boosting the profile of the SPLM and its leaders as part of US strategy to 
oppose the regime in Khartoum (see Reuters 2012, Woodward 2016).  Others such as 
Norway, and US church-aligned charities, substituted services such as health, education 
and agricultural infrastructure, during the periods of war, self-government and 
independence such that the SPLM was free of the responsibilities of administration and 
able to pursue its military rather than political goals that had little to do with building a 
unitary, let alone functional or developmental state.  Today, IGAD as an organisation and 
through its individual member states, plus the ‘troika’ of the US, Norway and the United 
Kingdom, continue to work for an end to the current conflict. 
This case study will start with analysis of the SPLM – the origins of its institutional faults 
and leadership instability.  The case study will then examine how leaders interacted with 
their party in the period of statebuilding from the end of the war in 2005 to the 
referendum on independence in January 2011; the brief ‘transition’ period between the 
referendum and independence in July 2011; and finally the period of statebuilding as an 
independent state up until the outbreak of civil war in December 2013.  It will then look 
at the influence of external actors, including reflections on the current peace process. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement – self-government, and a path to independence 
In January 2005 the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the second 
Sudanese civil war.  The negotiations had been led by IGAD since 1994 with close 
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support from the US, UK and Norway since 2001 (see Johnson 2011 for a detailed 
outline of the CPA negotiations). 
The CPA allowed for the three southern states (provinces) of Sudan to be governed 
autonomously under an elaborate power sharing arrangement that included a timetable 
for local elections.  This arrangement was set to run throughout the six year ‘interim’ 
period leading up to a referendum wherein eligible Southern Sudanese could decide 
whether to remain part of a unified Sudan or secede as an independent state (CPA 2005).  
If a simple majority of eligible voters chose independence then it would be declared after 
a six-month ‘transition’ period.  Against limited opposition the SPLM won elections held 
in Southern Sudan in 2010 and so upon independence became the governing party of 
South Sudan. 
A key caveat on the holding of the referendum was that both parties should work during 
the interim period to ‘make unity attractive’.  The six-year interim period, technically 
speaking, could have led to either a unified Sudan or the secession of South Sudan.  
While some Southern Sudanese actors may have seen the secession of the South as 
inevitable, possibly influencing how they approached setting up the institutions of an 
autonomous and possibly future independent state, the international community was more 
constrained in its efforts in order to not give the impression that it was influencing the 
referendum or presupposing its result.  This impacted the work of UN operations in 
particular, where such sensitivities were heightened in order to maintain its neutrality 
compared to bilateral partners such as the US (Johnson 2016). 
The CPA contained extensive language on democratic transformation of Sudan as a 
whole that was key to unifying elements of the SPLM/A based outside Southern Sudan to 
support the CPA (Young 2013).  The CPA included language on significant reform of the 
military (the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) as well as the SPLA), and other security 
agencies such as the police, and aspirational language about equality, human rights, and 
democratic principles for all of Sudan.  However these principles were rarely discussed 
during the interim period in an effort to prioritise peace over democratic transformation 
throughout Sudan and to meet externally set timelines for elections and the referendum 
(Young 2013).  It is arguable whether more time would have led to a different or better 
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outcome.  Sudan implemented little of the CPA’s calls for democratic transformation, 
equality or human rights and so grievances remained in its periphery even after South 
Sudan’s secession.  The aspirational language from the CPA was transferred with little 
amendment into the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan adopted upon 
independence (Transitional Consititution of South Sudan 2011), but as we shall see South 
Sudanese leader likewise failed to implement much of it. 
The SPLM – origins, leadership splits, and external support – ‘never functioned as a real 
party – or even as a liberation movement’2 
While Khartoum had signed peace agreements with other armed groups in Southern 
Sudan in the late 1990s, it was necessary to find an agreement with the SPLM/A in order 
to end Sudan’s second civil war (for details on Sudan's First Civil War of 1963-1972 see 
Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, Johnson 2012, Rolandsen and Daly 2016).  The following 
section will outline briefly the origins of the SPLM/A, its leadership dynamics and 
institutional structures and the external support it received during the civil war. 
The SPLM and SPLA were synonymous throughout the second Sudan civil war and 
many scholars refer to SPLM and SPLA during the period of 1983-2005 interchangeably 
or as SPLM/A.  This is because unlike other liberation movements that distinguished 
between a political and a military wing (such as FRETILIN/FALINTIL in Timor-Leste or 
the ANC/uMkhonto weSizwe in South Africa), the SPLM and SPLA incorporated both 
under a singular leadership.  The military side was pre-eminent.  Historian of the 
movement, Øystein Rolandsen, says that during the first ten years of the insurgency, the 
political ‘movement’ existed on paper only.  The insurgents were commonly referred to 
as only ‘the SPLA’ (Rolandsen 2005).   Apart from a matter of nomenclature, the lack of 
distinction between the political and military elements of the movement hindered any 
possible demilitarisation of the SPLM as it moved to govern post-CPA Southern Sudan 
and then post-independence South Sudan (De Waal 2014).   
Much of the scholarly analysis of the early SPLM is highly detailed, carefully tracing the 
dizzying array of factions and splits that have characterised the SPLM/A since its 																																																								2	(de	Waal	and	Mohammed	2014)	
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inception in 1983.  The Sudd Institute (2014) and Arop (2009) in particular go into great 
detail on the early formation and leadership contestation within the SPLM/A, including 
the role of Ethiopia in drafting the SPLM’s first manifesto, the appointment of John 
Garang as leader and early disagreements between the SPLM/A and other rebel groups 
(particularly the Anya Nya II), as does Rolandsen in his earlier history of the SPLM/A 
(Rolandsen 2005) and DH Johnson in his history of conflict in the Sudan (Johnson 2012). 
There are several important elements to draw from this detailed backstory.  The first is 
that the SPLM/A was divided at its inception over its ultimate goal and has continued to 
fracture into factions that are largely geographically based, but have an ethnic dimension.  
The second is that the SPLM has only ever had a very loose political ideology, in stark 
contrast to many of the other liberation movements in Africa – such as FRELIMO.  These 
elements have created difficulties for the SPLM in establishing legitimacy across all of 
what is now South Sudan.   
Rolandsen describes the SPLM/A of the civil war years as ‘an ever-changing alliance of 
factions and groups’ (Rolandsen 2015).  He says the initial core of rebels that ran to 
Ethiopia in 1983 consisted of mainly students, ‘intellectuals’ and former guerilla soldiers 
from Greater Upper Nile, Greater Bahr el-Ghazal (the states of Lakes, Northern Bahr el-
Ghazal, Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap), and Abyei and ethnically were mainly 
Dinka.  Sections of the Anya Nya II rebel group, mainly Nuer from Upper Nile, joined 
the SPLM/A in 1988.  So by the late 1980s the SPLM/A comprised three main factions: 
Dinka of Bahr el-Ghazal, Dinka of the Eastern side of the Nile centered around Twic East 
and Bor, and constellations of Nuer sub-groups.   
Rolandsen states that the faction on the Eastern side of the Nile was the strongest during 
the civil war, with John Garang (a Dinka from Bor) as its undisputed leader.  Garang had 
briefly fought with the Anya Nya rebel group in the first Sudanese civil war, and after 
being absorbed into the Sudanese military as part of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreement, rose to the rank of Colonel and was sponsored by Khartoum to complete a 
PhD in Agricultural Economics in the US (Phombeah 2005).  Rolandsen attributes the 
faction’s strength not just to its military power, but also to Garang’s personal charisma, 
which included the capacity to build alliances and groom and support young ambitious 
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officers who then owed him their loyalty.  Prominent among these were Deng Alor, 
Pagan Amum, Majak d’Agoot, Oyai Deng and Nhial Deng Nhial.  After his death, no 
undisputed leader emerged from this eastern bank faction, as its power relied on members’ 
proximity to Garang.  At independence many of these ‘Garang boys’ held key cabinet 
positions and power within the SPLM party apparatus (Rolandsen 2015).   
The second faction – the one that holds most power in the current government – is that of 
Salva Kiir (a Dinka from Bahr el-Ghazal).  His support base draws from Greater Bahr el-
Ghazal, but also elites from the southern Equatoria states, such as his current Vice 
President James Wani Igga.  In 2004, considering themselves sidelined by the other 
factions, Salva Kiir and his faction openly confronted Garang at a meeting of SPLA 
commanders in Rumbek, accusing Garang and his faction of being corrupt amongst other 
complaints, but refrained from a direct challenge on Garang’s leadership (Wel 2011, 
Johnson 2016).  According to Rolandsen, Kiir subsequently retained his position as 
second in command precisely because Garang considered him as no threat to his 
leadership (Rolandsen 2015). 
The third faction is that of Riek Machar, the history of which goes back to 1991.  Like 
Garang, Machar is highly educated with a PhD from the UK (BBC News 2016).  The 
detailed early histories of the SPLM/A point to the fall of the Mengistu regime in 
Ethiopia, that led to the rapid return of SPLM/A cadre to Sudan, as the catalyst for a 1991 
split in the SPLM/A that saw a number of leaders seek to overthrow Garang whom they 
considered dictatorial and displaying favouritism towards Garang’s Dinka tribe.  Once 
their coup failed, these leaders split off to form their own faction of the SPLM.  These 
officers included Machar (a Nuer) and Lam Akol (a Shilluk – the third largest ethnic 
group, found mainly in Upper Nile state).  The breakaway group called itself the SPLM-
Nasir faction after the small town near the Ethiopian border where it made its declaration 
(see Akol 2003).  This faction split multiple times over the next decade, during which it 
signed a peace agreement with Khartoum in 1997.  Riek Machar became Vice President 
of Sudan under that deal.  Eventually Machar rejoined the SPLM/A in 2002, recognising 
that his agreement with Khartoum was not being implemented (Rolandsen 2005).  Akol 
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formed a new political party, the SPLM-United, and unsuccessfully ran for President of 
Southern Sudan in 2010 (Sudan Tribune 2010). 
From the outset there were disagreements within the SPLM/A on whether its purpose was 
to fight for the liberation of southern Sudanese from the oppression and marginalisation 
they had experienced since colonial times from the Afro-Arab Islamist state of Sudan, or 
whether its purpose was to fight for the liberation of all marginalised peoples in Sudan 
through a transformation of Sudan itself to a more inclusive, participatory system.  This 
latter group included Darfuri in the west, the Nubians in the north, the Beja of the east 
and the inhabitants of the Nuba mountains and Blue Nile states in what is now the south 
of Sudan (Johnson 2012, 2013). 
The SPLM manifesto adopted in 1983, with the approval of the Mengistu regime in 
Ethiopia who were hosting the SPLM/A, called for transformation of a united Sudan.  
John Garang was the chief proponent of this vision of a ‘New Sudan’, which he would 
presumably lead (De Waal 2014).  A number of other leaders, notably including Salva 
Kiir, held more closely to independence for southern Sudanese rather than transforming 
Sudan itself.  This early disparity apparently led to the loss of some early adherents who 
thought they were fighting for one goal and then felt betrayed, and to difficulty attracting 
other armed groups to combine to fight Khartoum, as they were confused by the end goal 
espoused by the SPLM/A (Johnson 2013, The Sudd Institute 2014).  Machar’s SPLM-
Nasir faction was a proponent for an independent South Sudan rather than a reformed 
Sudan (Rolandsen and Daly 2016, 120). 
Both positions were accommodated in the CPA.  A vision of a unified, reformed Sudan 
was a key plank of the CPA, wherein both sides were meant to ‘make unity attractive’, 
but if after six years southern Sudanese were unconvinced they could vote for secession 
from the north.  The CPA allowed for ‘popular consultations’ on their status for the 
peoples of the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile – areas with 
significant SPLM/A support that would remain in Sudan after the South’s secession. 
John Garang’s death, three weeks after becoming Vice President of Sudan and President 
of Southern Sudan, and Salva Kiir’s elevation to the Presidency of Southern Sudan 
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marked the end of the ‘New Sudan’.  Kiir gave the concept lip service during the interim 
period, but effectively abandoned it as the SPLM’s primary goal (Johnson 2014).   
After Garang’s death in 2005, the SPLM leadership postponed the struggle over control 
of the party, and as no member of Garang’s faction had been groomed to replace him, the 
party followed the existing military hierarchy and appointed deputy Kiir as the new party 
chairman.  Again, following hierarchy, Riek Machar was appointed his Deputy and Lam 
Akol the Foreign Minister.  Those in Garang’s faction considered Kiir’s appointment 
temporary and were prepared to bide their time for a challenge (Rolandsen 2015).  At the 
2008 party convention (only the second held since its formation – the first being in 1994), 
Riek Machar contested the Chair of the SPLM, which would result in him being 
candidate for President of Southern Sudan in the 2010 elections.  Kiir blocked this and 
stated at the convention that he no longer wanted to work with Machar and SPLM 
Secretary-General Pagan Amum (The Sudd Institute 2014).  The convention was highly 
contested, but eventually the delegates voted to keep the status quo to ensure continuity 
and unity within the party in the face of 2010 elections against Sudan’s ruling party, the 
National Congress Party (The Sudd Institute 2014).  
The 2010 elections saw increased divisions within the SPLM.  The selection process for 
SPLM candidates was deemed undemocratic and many of those who lost out for official 
SPLM slots ran as independents and lost to the SPLM candidate – causing most to launch 
armed rebellions (including David Yau Yau, George Athor, Johnson Oliny and Gatluak 
Gai, all from the Greater Upper Nile states).  Some of these independents, including 
former Dinka members of the SPLA, have now aligned themselves to Machar’s SPLM-
IO, reflecting that the handling of the 2010 election by the dominant faction at the time 
continues to leave a bitter taste (The Sudd Institute 2014). 
Many countries, especially post-conflict countries, have experienced political 
contestation by elites within dominant political parties with imperfect internal democracy.  
What seems to have triggered the level and persistence of violence in South Sudan since 
2013 was that parallel to the political crisis was a structural crisis in the national military, 
still known in independent South Sudan as the SPLA. 
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During the second civil war the SPLA was considered exceptionally brave in battle, 
willing to suffer high levels of casualties.  De Waal and Mohammed say: ‘the SPLA did 
not win the war against the North; rather, the extraordinary capacity of its regular and 
irregular fighters to resist defeat showed Khartoum that it could never rule the South 
Sudanese against their will’ (de Waal and Mohammed 2014).   
The initial formation of the SPLA started with the mutiny of the Bor Garrison on 16 May 
1983, followed by several other Southern garrisons in the following months.  Colonel 
John Garang was sent by Khartoum to mediate, but ended up joining the mutineers and as 
we have seen leading the insurgency.  Initially the SPLA was just one of many rebel 
groups in the South.  Over the next years various groups combined forces with the SPLA 
to attack Government positions (Rolandsen 2005).  This meant that structurally the SPLA 
was never a cohesive unit, nor was it centrally commanded or coordinated.  Often ad hoc 
units were drawn together for a specific battle, with single units drawn from single ethnic 
groups (de Waal and Mohammed 2014).   
There are numerous commentators highly critical of John Garang’s leadership of the 
SPLA in the 1980s, saying his use of force and intrigue to bolster his position as supreme 
leader of the movement led to tension (Akol 2003, Rolandsen 2005), and accusing him of 
war crimes and ordering the massacre of entire villages (for example, see ESPAC 2000, 
and Lam 2007), or of relying too heavily on appeals to racial and ethnic solidarity (de 
Waal and Mohammed 2014).  Others suggest that atrocities committed by the SPLA 
against civilian populations during the second civil war reflected its ad hoc nature and 
that oftentimes high-level commanders could not control the actions of irregular forces 
(Johnson 2012).   
What is clear is that the dissatisfaction with Garang’s leadership that led to the 1991 split 
of the SPLM/A into Garang’s SPLM-Torit faction and Machar and Akol’s SPLM-Nasir 
faction saw a massive increase of fighting between southerners and Khartoum fuelled 
these divisions to its advantage (de Waal and Mohammed 2014).  This violence was often 
directed at civilians.  Troops of contending factions showed little regard for the human 
rights of their ‘fellow’ southerners.  The most notorious of these was the ‘Bor Massacre’ 
of August 1991 where thousands of Dinka in Bor were killed allegedly on orders from 
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Machar (The Sudd Institute 2014).  The 1991 split also saw over 30 militia groups carve 
out territories within the Nuer nation, resulting in almost the whole Greater Upper Nile 
area (Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states) becoming completely isolated from the rest of 
the country (The Sudd Institute 2014).  Often these units were established by 
communities to protect their people and assets from predation by the SPLA and other 
ethnic groups, but many also aligned at times with Machar’s forces (Johnson 2014).  By 
the end of the civil war the social fabric of South Sudan was almost beyond repair (de 
Waal and Mohammed 2014).   
When the CPA was signed the SPLA continued to be just one of many military forces in 
South Sudan.  Soon after becoming President of Southern Sudan in 2005, Salva Kiir, 
reached out to the leaders of other armed groups to offer them membership of the SPLA 
and government.  Many of these groups were those from Greater Upper Nile who had 
received backing from Khartoum and had fought against the SPLA during the civil war.  
The Juba cease-fire agreement of 2006, which cemented this arrangement saw the SPLA 
payroll expand from approximately 40,000 to over 200,000.  This resulted in 55 per cent 
of Southern Sudan’s budget, financed by increasing oil revenues, going to defence 
spending, over 80 per cent of that going to salaries.  While this deal averted civil war at 
the time, the payout essentially created a national army that was little more than ‘a 
coalition of ethnic units tied together by cash handouts’ (de Waal and Mohammed 2014).  
Given this history it is unsurprising that most of the SPLA units that have mutinied 
against the government to support Machar’s forces have come from reincorporated anti-
SPLA militia, and most of the fighting has been confined to the three states of the Greater 
Upper Nile – Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile – that were the sites of fighting between the 
SPLA and Riek Machar’s breakaway faction in the 1990s (Johnson 2014).  Apart from 
the SPLA’s fragile composition, along ethnic and geographic lines, Alex de Waal (2014) 
also attributes the current fighting to a failure of the ‘political marketplace’ in a 
militarised, neo-patrimonial kleptocracy bankrupted by the government’s poor handling 
of its relationship with Sudan over oil revenue that resulted in a 2012 shutdown in 
production.  In short, by the end of 2013 the government in South Sudan could ‘no longer 
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afford the loyalty payments to these armed groups and the system fell apart’ (De Waal 
2014).   
Years of lost opportunity – the ‘interim’ period between the end of war and the choice for 
independence 
If Garang’s death marked the end of the SPLM working toward a reformed ‘New Sudan’ 
then it follows that his replacement as President of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir, would 
focus his government’s efforts on building state institutions in preparation for eventual 
independence.  Rather, the six-year interim period is widely considered a missed 
opportunity where little institution building took place and corruption was rampant as 
revenue from a share of Sudan’s oil sales began to flow.   
Security tension dominated the interim period.  Southern Sudanese leaders, and many 
external actors, saw the CPA as a ceasefire rather than a final agreement and feared that 
Sudan – particularly hardliners in the regime – would prefer to revert to war with the 
South than allow either the referendum to proceed or for independence to be declared 
(Rolandsen and Daly 2016).  During CPA negotiations in 2002 Sudan envoys directly 
asked US envoys whether Sudan would be taken off the US list of state sponsors of 
terrorism (which carries specific trade sanctions including limits on Sudan’s access to 
international finance) if it supported South Sudan’s secession, as it could afford to give 
up oil revenue to the South if it could secure access to international financial markets 
(Reuters 2012).  While there is evidence the US supported de-listing in 2002 (Johnson 
2011, Reuters 2012), Khartoum’s allegedly genocidal response to rebellion in Darfur 
starting in 2003 and failure to cooperate with the International Criminal Court meant that 
this de-listing never happened (Woodward 2016).  Sudan lost a major incentive to 
implement its part of the CPA.  The situation in Darfur also meant that following the 
signing of the CPA policy time in western capitals on Sudanese issues was absorbed 
identifying ways to end what had been termed genocide in Darfur rather than devoting 
close attention to SPLM governance and statebuilding during the interim period.   
The promise of self-government raised expectations in Southern Sudan unable to be met 
by the low capacity of government institutions.  Many of the structures and systems in 
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place were based on the rudimentary administration established under the ‘indirect rule’ 
system of colonial regime prior to 1953 characterised by a system of chieftaincies and 
territorial ethnicity (Rolandsen and Daly 2016, 143).  Other key aspects of statebuilding 
were carried over from the flawed 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement that ended the 
first civil war, such as the designation of Juba as the capital and most bureaucratic 
structures (Rolandsen and Daly 2016, 91), and by 2005 were ‘antiquated and worn-down’ 
(Rolandsen and Daly 2016, 143).  Government entities were empty shells, with 
dilapidated buildings and a few people ‘shuffling papers’ inside and yet often had 
payrolls of thousands of staff paid during the war to do nothing other than not join the 
rebels (Johnson 2016).  The SPLM/A sought to establish a new administrative structure 
with government representation at the province, county, payam (town) and boma 
(village) level.  According to Rolandsen and Daly this greater representation of ‘rebel 
government’ did not improve or initiate government service as SPLM officials expected 
foreign NGOs and the UN to provide what was needed and often the only manifestation 
of the ‘state’ at the local level was ‘a mud hut, a flagpole, and a desk and chair’ 
(Rolandsen and Daly 2016, 144).  Changes in Juba were noticeable with increased 
construction and availability of consumer goods as transport corridors were opened.  
Outside of Juba some schools and hospitals were rehabilitated and wells and boreholes 
drilled, but such achievements fell far short of community expectations.  By 2009 there 
was still only one paved road in Southern Sudan (Johnson 2016).  Quickly the new 
government came to be seen by Southern Sudanese and foreigners alike as corrupt and 
inefficient (Rolandsen and Daly 2016). 
Financing for development was not a problem for Southern Sudan, but it lacked any 
capacity to receive or disburse funds and the political will to spend the money on 
statebuilding.  Under the CPA wealth sharing provisions, Southern Sudan started getting 
a fifty per cent share of Sudan’s oil revenue.  As there was initially no financial 
institutions in Southern Sudan the first transfers from Khartoum to Juba came in the form 
of cash in boxes and went straight to the SPLM Headquarters (Johnson 2016).  In 2007 
the World Bank observed that the SPLM Secretariat of Finance, which pre-CPA managed 
annual resources of around $100,000, ‘transformed into a Ministry responsible for 
managing over one and a half billion dollars annually’ (The World Bank 2007) and by 
	 78	
2011 was managing double this (De Waal 2014).  Southern Sudanese leaders, including 
John Garang before his death, resisted suggestions to put the revenue from oil into an 
externally managed sovereign wealth fund (resembling that used by Norway and Timor-
Leste).  The oil was not seen as a resource for all South Sudanese to be managed for 
generations, but rather an entitlement for those in power who had subsisted in the bush 
for decades and for whom now ‘was their turn to eat’ (Johnson 2016).  As income grew 
so did expenditure.  The budget of the Government of Southern Sudan in 2005 was 
US$14.5 million.  In 2006 it was US$1.34 billion.  As mentioned previously over 55 per 
cent of this was defence spending as a result of the 2006 peace agreement with southern 
militia; most of the remainder was government salaries being used to lubricate the 
patronage network (Johnson 2016). 
Donors such as Norway and the World Bank set up trust funds to assist establish some of 
the foundational institutions of self-government, focusing on transforming the SPLM/A 
into a civilian administration, establishing the nascent structures of government and 
funding some quick impact development projects as peace dividends.  Soon these funds, 
which were under-committed, were rather financing salary bills for the ‘ghost staff’ and 
basic service delivery on behalf of the government (Johnson 2016).  To avoid pre-
supposing the referendum result and under direction from Khartoum donors were unable 
to assist in establishing key sovereign institutions such as a Central Bank, immigration, 
customs and border control agencies, ministries of foreign affairs or trade, civil aviation 
or state security.  Donors focused on embedding foreign experts in Southern Sudanese 
government institutions, but locals did not want foreigners in their offices and resisted 
these schemes, including initiatives from IGAD.  The International Development 
Minister of Norway commented at the time, that while Southern Sudanese’s desire for 
sovereignty was understandable, ‘one doesn’t know what one doesn’t know, particularly 
if one has never been part of a functional government’ (Johnson 2016). 
The dominance of a military mind-set amongst Southern Sudan’s new leaders limited 
their ability to re-think relations between the state and society and establish important 
institutional constraints such as civilian oversight over the military.  This manifested in 
the pre-eminence of military rank and service over political competence or technical 
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skills in the allocation of ministerial posts or senior positions in the bureaucracy (Johnson 
2016).  This tendency was also reinforced by the extensive military patronage system that 
had developed during the war, such that during self-governance and through 
independence SPLA commanders had formed a new aristocracy – ‘a military elite’ – that 
by 2013 pervaded almost all government institutions with the purpose of resource capture 
(Pinaud 2014).  For example, by 2013, eight out of ten provincial governors were ex-
SPLA.  In many ways the SPLA were continuing corrupt practices from the civil war that 
had included selling food and humanitarian aid (Nyaba 1996, De Waal 2014) and abusing 
campaigns set up by US evangelical groups to buy the freedom of Christian ‘slaves’ held 
by northerners (Iversen 2007, De Waal 2014). 
A hasty divorce - brief ‘transition’ brings security threats and international confusion 
By the time the referendum was held in January 2011 and the emphatic choice of the 
Southern Sudanese for independence made clear, there was only six months to attempt to 
build the institutions of a sovereign state before independence would be declared in July 
2011.  What had not been achieved in six years would not be achieved in six months and 
certainly not against the backdrop of escalating tension with Khartoum and international 
confusion. 
The six month ‘transition’ period saw the SPLM government and Khartoum in effect 
attempt to re-negotiate the CPA as they sought agreement on outstanding matters such as 
final wealth sharing, management of oil located in South Sudan but processed in Sudan, 
borders and citizenship (Belloni 2011).  This ‘hasty divorce’ was made nasty by the 
unresolved status of the purportedly oil rich Abyei region and remaining SPLM/A 
fighters in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states in Sudan.  A referendum scheduled to 
be held in Abyei at the same time as that in Southern Sudan to decide whether to stay in 
Sudan or move to a newly independent South Sudan was never held owing to 
disagreements over who would be eligible to vote (the sedentary/resident Ngok Dinka as 
well as the nomadic Arab Misseriya).  Sudanese armed forces took the area by force in 
May 2011 to pre-empt a rumoured declaration by the Ngok Dinka to move to South 
Sudan’s territory.  It did not help that the SPLM had included Abyei as the territory of 
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South Sudan in its Transitional Constitution.  Armed conflict then broke out in the Nuba 
Mountains of Southern Kordofan in May and June 2011 that resulted in the displacement 
of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese.  Southern Sudanese leaders responded with 
deployments of SPLA troops to the border – key parts of which had yet to be demarcated. 
The international community was left flat-footed by Khartoum’s actions and the enormity 
of the looming independence of a country that many long-term observers did not feel was 
institutionally ready.  The UN Security Council, in particular, was in some confusion.  It 
was expected that the peace operation that had been in Sudan since 2005 to help 
implement the CPA would have a period of overlap with a new operation mandated to 
help build the new state of South Sudan (UNMISS).  Instead Khartoum announced that 
the current peace operation in Sudan, UNMIS, would cease operations on 9 July, as its 
mandate was implementation of the CPA and now the interim period was over it was 
moot (Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan 2011).  This meant any chance of 
gradually rolling UNMIS functions into the UNMISS mandate were impossible and 
UNMIS would meet an abrupt end (despite many elements of the CPA remaining 
outstanding).   
While the Security Council was broadly in agreement on the elements of the mandate of 
the new UN peace operation, as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report to 
the Council of May 2011 (UN Secretary General 2011), uncertainty over the SPLA force 
posture, due to continued threats from the north, contributed to difficulties for the 
Council in reaching decisions on the mandate, leadership structure and force strength of 
the new mission and the UN’s role in demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration 
(DDR) activity and security sector reform (Security Council Report 2011b).  Some 
Security Council members questioned the ability of a new mission in South Sudan to be 
at all quarantined from the realities of events unfolding in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and 
possibly Blue Nile.  Some questioned whether a DDR mandate would even be possible, 
given the force posture of the SPLA in response to insecurity along the border (Security 
Council Report 2011a).  Ongoing discussion in the Council on the situation in Abyei and 
Southern Kordofan absorbed considerable Council attention until South Sudan’s 
independence. 
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Thirty months of independence fails to build a state before war breaks out 
On 9 July 2011 all security tensions with Khartoum and doubts about South Sudan’s 
viability were put to one side as South Sudan celebrated its independence.  Sudan was the 
first country to recognise South Sudan’s independence (Sudan Tribune 2011).  President 
Kiir spoke to the over 100,000 gathered at John Garang Mausoleum in Juba: ‘From today 
on, we shall have no excuses or scapegoats to blame.  It is our responsibility to protect 
ourselves, our land and our resources […] While the pillars of a house are important, its 
foundation is more critical.  We must build a strong foundation for our nation’ (quoted in 
Johnson 2016, 1-2). 
The foundation was never built.  The first year of independence saw South Sudan’s 
leaders preoccupied with the threat from Khartoum and the ongoing negotiations over 
implementing the final stages of the CPA.  A dispute over oil transport fees saw South 
Sudan’s leaders announce a unilateral shutdown of oil production in January 2012 (BBC 
News 2012) which hit both countries hard and ramped up tension at the border.  Sporadic 
fighting flared between the two countries in the border regions of Unity and Upper Nile 
states, which saw its nadir in South Sudan’s seizure of the Heglig oil field in April 2012.   
Internally, after independence the SPLM government became more autocratic, with 
power quickly concentrating in the executive and in President Kiir.  Kiir focused on 
building the institutions that consolidated his power, in particular internal security and 
intelligence functions with assistance from long-time ally Israel (Associated Press 2016).  
Brooking no internal criticism, Kiir soon made moves to restrict the activity of NGOs 
(Office of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights 2013) and limit press freedoms 
(Sudan Tribune 2013b).  In late 2012 and early 2013 as President Kiir became more pre-
occupied with leadership tensions within the SPLM he gradually started dismantling it as 
an institution.  The political crisis that ensued in the ruling and single party of the state 
demonstrated the centrality and limitations of South Sudan’s political system to its 
statebuilding project.  Political power is concentrated in the executive branch of 
government; and there in the hands of the President who under the Transitional 
Constitution is able to appoint (and thus remove) the Vice President, Cabinet and 
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Provincial Governors.   
Despite reports of some disagreements between Kiir and Machar over the transitional 
constitution, apparently the factions within the SPLM were able to maintain some 
semblance of unity between the 2010 election and independence.  Soon after 
independence disagreements between the factions grew.  The Sudd Institute considers the 
trigger of the political crisis to be a tour by members of the SPLM political bureau of all 
ten states of South Sudan undertaken in late 2012 and early 2013.  The expressed aim of 
the tour was to thank the people for their unwavering support during the years of struggle 
and for overwhelmingly voting for independence.  However, the response from the 
people had ‘a chilling effect on the SPLM leadership’ as leaders ‘found that what was 
planned to be a congratulatory affair turned out largely as a condemnation of the party’ 
(The Sudd Institute 2014 p. 4).  In the view of the grassroots, the ruling party had lost 
vision and direction, and had not been able to deliver the badly needed essential services 
such as road networks, health facilities, security, and education.  Following the tour there 
were rounds of accusations in the SPLM leadership as to whom in the party was 
responsible for the increasing unpopularity of the SPLM.  This ultimately led to a 
meeting of the political bureau in March 2013 where several leading figures in the SPLM, 
including Machar, SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum, and John Garang’s widow 
Rebecca Garang, indicated their interest in replacing Kiir as head of the SPLM, and 
therefore the SPLM’s candidate for President at the next national election then scheduled 
for 2015 (The Sudd Institute 2014). 
On 18 June 2013 Salva Kiir fired his Minister of Finance, Kosti Manibe, and Cabinet 
Affairs Minister, Deng Alor, purportedly for making a US$7 million purchase of office 
safes without Kiir’s approval (Sudan Tribune 2013a).  On 23 July 2013 Salva Kiir 
dismissed Vice President Riek Machar and his entire Cabinet, ostensibly as an important 
step in tackling rampant corruption, and suspended Pagan Amum, placing him effectively 
under house arrest ahead of an investigation into Amum’s actions of ‘inciting violence 
and criticising his actions’ (Sudan Tribune 2013c).  At the time commentators saw this as 
both a possible threat to stability and an opportunity to tackle corruption and 
mismanagement (see Lucey 2013).  In October and November Kiir dissolved the political 
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organs of the SPLM, thus shutting down any group decision-making ability (Sudan 
Tribune 2013d).   
On 6 December 2013 Machar, and others including Amum and Rebecca Garang, released 
a press statement outlining six points that according to the group illustrated the decline in 
the political culture of the SPLM since the death of John Garang, highlighting the 
increased tendencies of Salva Kiir to concentrate power in his hands alone, make 
decisions that favour ‘regional and ethnic lobbies and business interests’, and surround 
himself with pro-Khartoum ministers.  Many of these criticisms echoed those of former 
SPLM Cabinet Minister, Peter Nyaba (2011), who today aligns himself with Machar’s 
SPLM-IO.  The statement also accuses Kiir of forming a personal army in the guise of a 
Presidential Guard and wanting to erase the legacy of the liberation movement.  It also 
drew public attention to approximately US$4.5 billion in loans that the government had 
accrued from unknown sources (Plaut 2013). 
On 8 December the SPLM loyal to President Kiir released its own statement, countering 
each point in turn, calling those behind the 6 December statement a disgruntled group 
‘united by one common cause of having lost influence or power in the party’ who did not 
understand party discipline (Office of the Deputy Chairman of the SPLM 2013).  
President Kiir called a meeting of the National Liberation Council for 14-16 December.  
Machar and Garang attended the first day, and boycotted the second in frustration at how 
‘undemocratic the meeting was proving to be’ (The London Evening Post Editorial Team 
2014).  That evening violence broke out. 
Machar’s press statement of 6 December 2013, while self-serving, elaborated for the first 
time in public the SPLM’s internal and external struggle over legitimacy.  Public mention 
of the US$4.5 billion loan also highlighted profligate spending and entrenched corruption 
when few were seeing the fruits of development.  Machar’s public airing of grievances 
over the lack of party democracy and the stifling and defamation of internal critics of the 
President highlighted that there were few formal, private avenues within existing party 
decision-making to take up grievances, thus forcing him to confront Kiir publicly.  On the 
other hand, according to interviews conducted by The Sudd Institute with SPLM officials 
in 2014, despite espousing the need for internal democracy, throughout 2012 and 2013 
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Machar wanted to cut a political deal with Salva Kiir that would make him the next 
Chairman of the SPLM without needing endorsement from a party convention.  Kiir’s 
rejection of such a deal precipitated the internal conflict (The Sudd Institute 2014).  
Regardless of his ostensible support for democratic institutions, Machar’s rapid embrace 
of violence post-December 2013 demonstrated he shared a tendency to reach for the 
military tactics of the civil war period rather than continue to pursue democratic means to 
power.  Machar, like many in the SPLM, remained ‘unreconstructed’ (as per Lyons 2016). 
External Actors – enablers of the SPLM turned critics, and regional peacemakers 
The central message of the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, 
Security and Development, WDR 2011 (The World Bank 2011) is that ‘strengthening 
legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is 
crucial to break cycles of violence’.  The Report highlights restoring confidence and 
transforming security, justice, and economic institutions requires ‘a combination of 
leadership and international support – normally, neither alone can suffice’.  To build a 
more complete picture of South Sudan’s statebuilding, we therefore need to consider its 
sources of international support. 
International actors have played a significant role in the independence of South Sudan, 
‘rightly perceived as the baby of the international community’ (Khadiagala 2014).  
Negotiations for the CPA were led by Kenya, under the auspices of the regional group in 
the Horn of Africa, IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), with strong 
technical and high-level political support and facilitation from the US, UK and Norway 
(known as ‘the troika’).  Neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa have all been 
involved, both bilaterally or through IGAD, at times either supporting or opposing 
Southern Sudanese rebels as a response to the changing dynamics of their relationship to 
Khartoum over time, for their own ideological reasons, or owing to the burden of hosting 
Sudanese refugees (see de Waal 2015, and Copeland 2016, for recent detailed 
descriptions of the geo-politics of the region).   
Other countries, such as Israel, have engaged extensively with South Sudan, including 
providing security services, training and surveillance equipment, as much to build 
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support in the UN General Assembly as a response to their opposition to Khartoum, 
which has provided material assistance to Palestinian groups (Associated Press 2016).   
Other liberation movements have at times sought to engage the SPLM in party-to-party 
talks to assist in institution building (see Fabricius 2014, and Awolich 2015 for an outline 
of past efforts particularly of South Africa's African National Congress (ANC)), and to 
share lessons from their own transition to governing (Official Spokesperson for the 
Government of Timor-Leste 2011).  Cuba educated over 600 young Sudanese as doctors 
and engineers sent across in the 1980s and 1990s by the SPLM (Fleming 2010).   
As the world’s most oil-dependent economy (The World Bank 2016), South Sudan’s 
reliance on oil revenue to finance government has seen its links to China, Malaysia and 
India strengthen as their state-owned oil companies are major shareholders in Sudanese 
and South Sudanese oil fields (Shankleman 2011).   
The UN has been present in Southern Sudan since it led humanitarian efforts in the 1980s, 
with two separate peace operations operating during the interim period (UNMIS) and 
since independence (UNMISS), and a further two peace operations in Sudan (UNAMID 
in Darfur and UNISFA in Abyei).   
While there was celebration upon independence at the ‘liberation’ of the South Sudanese 
(Epstein 2011), the persistent conflict in South Sudan has led many commentators and 
participants to question the role that the international community, particularly the United 
States, has played in both creating and building the state of South Sudan (Vertin 2016).  It 
can be argued that the US was a significant source of external legitimacy for the SPLM, 
particularly by building the international credibility of its leader John Garang. 
De Waal says that the SPLM deftly manipulated American and European sentiment 
throughout the second civil war, ‘developing the narrative of a Christian people 
oppressed by an Arab-Muslim government, in order to win international backing 
including a free pass on human rights and corruption issues’ (De Waal 2014).  But this 
narrative was also being augmented by Christian missionaries and humanitarian 
organisations in Sudan who were reporting back to the US attacks on their churches and 
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who were openly referring to the war as a ‘genocide’ by the Muslim north against the 
Christian south (Iversen 2007).  The US evangelical lobby took up the cause of the 
Southern Sudanese people with zeal, and finally found a high-level supporter following 
the election of George W. Bush as US President in 2000.  Only nine months into office, 
Bush appointed Senator (and ordained Anglican priest) John Danforth as ‘Special Envoy 
for Peace to the Sudan’, with a large staff including a full-time presence at the existing 
IGAD peace talks in Kenya, with the specific task of ending the civil war (Iversen 2007). 
The evangelical lobby may have secured the support of the President, but there was 
another group active within the US administration and academia that had been working 
since the late 1970s for the independence of South Sudan.  The group called itself the 
‘Council’ and at its peak comprised: Brian d’Silva (a USAID official who studied his 
PhD in agriculture at Iowa in 1978 with John Garang), Roger Winter (a former 
government official turned humanitarian worker who had travelled frequently to Sudan), 
Francis Deng (Sudanese legal scholar and UN official), Ted Dagne (an Ethiopian refugee 
who became a Congressional support officer and an adviser to the South Sudan 
government upon independence), John Prendergast (who had joined the group before 
working at the State Department), Eric Reeves (an English literature professor who 
became the group’s chief op-ed writer), and sometimes Susan Rice (Assistant Secretary 
of State for Africa in the US State Department - who became the US Ambassador to the 
UN under Obama’s first term and National Security Adviser in his second).  In 2012 
Reuters interviewed the ‘Council’ who provided a detailed history of their individual 
efforts and how these worked in with those of evangelicals, Congress, State Department 
and the President to build support for South Sudan’s independence (Reuters 2012).   
The uniting force for the ‘Council’ was the admiration they all had for John Garang, who 
they individually knew and had worked with throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  D’Silva 
and Dagne in particular were personally very close to Garang, often in daily or weekly 
contact (Reuters 2012).  They acknowledged that the SPLA committed atrocities under 
Garang’s leadership, but felt that these were justified against similar atrocities committed 
by Khartoum.  This group of US lobbyists significantly contributed to the credibility of 
John Garang in the US and by extension the SPLM/A as the legitimate representatives of 
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the people of Southern Sudan.  For example, the ‘Council’ organised visits for Garang to 
Washington DC and coordinated visits by US officials to rebel-held parts of South Sudan 
(Reuters 2012).  Garang, alone, also had credibility with the neighbouring countries 
leading the peace effort (De Waal 2014).  Norwegian Envoy to the IGAD talks, Hilde 
Johnson, cannot hide her deep admiration for ‘Dr John’ in her account of the talks (see 
Johnson 2011).  After Garang’s death they all rallied behind Salva Kiir.  In 2012 most 
members of the ‘Council’ said that they believed their efforts were justified, and the 
independence of South Sudan trumped all the faults in the CPA and its implementation.  
As Dagne said: ‘All the other issues are minor once you have your sovereignty’, (Reuters 
2012). 
Ultimately their unwavering support for South Sudanese independence did not translate 
to ongoing access or influence to Salva Kiir as time went on and eventually 
disillusionment with the direction of the country under Kiir’s leadership grew.  This 
manifested most plainly in the public release of a letter to Salva Kiir from Winter, Reeves, 
Prendergast and Dagne on the eve of independence day on 8 July 2013, in which they 
say: ‘some of us have communicated our concerns with you privately and confidentially 
in the past, always as friends’ (Winter et al. 2013).  The letter reads as a cri de Coeur 
where the group notes its concern over the ‘increasingly perilous fate of South Sudan’ 
where ‘after almost nine years of self-rule, the government is still failing to meet the 
basic needs of its people’.  The letter highlights SPLA abuses against civilians on the 
basis of ethnicity, obviously under orders, and impunity over public murders of 
journalists by security services: ‘we joined you in your fight against these very abuses by 
the Khartoum regime for many years.  We cannot turn a blind eye when yesterday’s 
victims become today’s perpetrators’.  It also notes that ‘in a remarkably short period of 
time, the name of your country has become synonymous with corruption’ and that the 
only ones who have benefited from independence are those who ‘have become wealthy 
by misappropriating government funds’.  What is remarkable about the letter is that 
throughout it the authors seem to suggest that Kiir is not part of all these problems, as it 
continuously applauds his statements where he worries about the level of corruption or of 
‘ill-discipline’ in SPLA ranks.  Prendergast has gone on to form The Sentry, an 
organisation that seeks to document the level of corruption and war profiteering in South 
	 88	
Sudan which in September 2016 released a report, ‘War Crimes Shouldn’t Pay’ (The 
Sentry 2016) outlining business and overseas property holdings of senior SPLM/A. 
Following the outbreak of violence in December 2013 the African Union commissioned a 
an inquiry into its causes, chaired by former President of Nigeria, Olusegan Obasanjo, 
which concluded both Salva Kiir and Riek Machar had command responsibility for 
troops who had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity (AU Commission of 
Inquiry on South Sudan 2014).  It suggested transitional justice measures to deal with 
these crimes, but no external actor has pursued this path.  Kiir and Machar signed an 
IGAD-mediated ceasefire in 2014 – that was soon ignored – and a further agreement 
setting up a government of national unity in 2015 – that collapsed almost immediately.  
Since conflict began armed groups have continued to shift loyalty back and forth between 
the opposition and government forces and continue to splinter, as fighting spreads to new 
parts of South Sudan.  ACLED estimates at present there are three active rebel groups 
and over 40 militia involved in armed violence (ACLED 2016).   
A deep dilemma faces the external actors seeking to find an end to the violence.  On the 
one hand it is clear that Kiir and Machar need to be part of a negotiated solution, as each 
commands a considerable number of troops.  Even though Machar is no longer based in 
South Sudan, he commands sufficient loyalty to be a spoiler of any agreement to which 
he is not a party.  On the other hand it is also clear to external mediators that both Kiir 
and Machar are the source of the problem and a long-term solution would see neither in 
power.  There have been numerous suggestions for a ‘third’ leader – either an SPLM 
leader not aligned with either Kiir or Machar or an external trustee.  The only other 
source of leadership in the SPLM is from amongst the ‘Garang boys’ – all of whom were 
jailed in the days following the events of December 2013.  Although now released, their 
appeal to external actors such as the US (i.e. they have not been involved in fighting) is 
precisely why they cannot replace Kiir, as they do not command any troops, which is the 
only source of governing legitimacy in the deeply militarised South Sudanese elite.  This 
problem would be even greater for an external trustee – such as a UN Administrator – 
who would not be able to garner sufficient support from the SPLA, and other armed 
groups to govern any territory in South Sudan outside a small perimeter of the capital. 
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Conclusions 
Returning to theories of leadership, it is worth looking again at Leftwich’s theory of 
developmental leadership, which he said was best understood as a contextually 
contingent political process wherein leadership: ‘involves forging formal or informal 
coalitions, vertical or horizontal, of leaders and elites, in order to solve the pervasive 
collective action problems which define the challenges of growth and development’ 
(Leftwich 2009).  It is on this basis that South Sudan’s leaders have failed their people.  
All leadership decisions during the interim period and after independence seem to be 
focused on either individual enrichment or consolidation or contestation of individual 
power rather than solving any collective action problem, let alone one that may address 
the challenges of growth or development.  Kiir does not fight in order to lead a united 
South Sudan into growth and development, and Machar does not fight because he has a 
competing vision for how to improve the lives of his people.  Individual militia leaders 
fight to either protect their community or to loot or kill their perceived competitors.  
National leaders fight for short-term spoils from oil revenue and perceptions of ethnic 
supremacy of their group over others.  Much of the initial conflict arose out of a deep 
animosity between Kiir and Machar driven by decades of justifiable distrust. 
In looking at the interaction between leaders and institutions highlighted by Khadiagala 
and Lyons (2006) as key in post-conflict leadership, particularly leaders of the SPLM and 
the party, it is clear that there have been few attempts over its history to build the SPLM 
into an institution able to function as the location of internal contestation or as a 
constraint on individual leaders.  As Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed highlight, 
arguments over democracy in the SPLM or its revolutionary purpose obscure a deeper 
point that the SPLM never functioned as a real party or even as a liberation movement.  
In its early years the SPLM was an army, and the only person to handle its politics were 
John Garang (de Waal and Mohammed 2014).  Over its more than 30 year history the 
SPLM has only ever held two party conventions, in 1994 and 2008, despite its structures 
indicating they should be held every five years (see Rolandsen 2005 for a more detailed 
outline of the 1994 convention).   
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De Waal and Mohammed say that the SPLM concealed its lack of any practical agenda 
for internal social change under its rhetoric of fighting external oppression.  Plus, unlike 
other liberation movements, which established literacy programs, land reform and local 
democracy, the SPLM simply outsourced minimum social welfare to international 
humanitarian agencies, drew on foreign advisers for its diplomacy (such as Independent 
Diplomat) and welcomed a UN peace operation immediately upon independence.  
Against this evidence de Waal and Mohammed conclude that South Sudan’s ruling elites 
have always been more interested in power than doing the hard work of nation building 
and so it is not surprising that to date South Sudan’s political institutions are weak (de 
Waal and Mohammed 2014). 
The international community, in particular western donors such as the US and Norway 
who were so supportive of the independence of South Sudan, largely chose to ignore the 
extreme financial corruption, the abuse of power by the SPLM, and its increasing 
abandonment of the democratic principles for which it purportedly fought (Vertin 2016).  
Zach Vertin who worked for current US envoy to Sudan and South Sudan Don Booth 
from 2013 to 2016 says: “Over the course of two decades, South Sudan’s backers 
coddled the SPLM, embraced a simplified narrative and shaped a policy environment in 
which criticism was reserved for an undeniably awful regime in Khartoum – the ‘bad 
guys’.  Criticism of the ‘good guys’, meanwhile, was either spared or suppressed, and 
sentiments that didn’t fit this narrative were framed either as moral equivalency or as 
indirectly aiding the enemy” (Vertin 2016).  This overwhelming focus on the SPLM also 
meant donors missed the opportunity to advance pluralism (Khadiagala 2014). 
While this may reflect the views of high-level policy makers, international aid agencies 
and non-government organisations were working with each other to help Juba build its 
governance institutions.  In this task international actors have struggled to find a balance 
between support for reconstruction efforts and pressures on the government to promote 
accountability, responsibility, and ownership.  Because of weak state capacities, 
international actors ended up retaining the parallel institutions for service delivery and 
humanitarian assistance that dominated during the civil war (Khadiagala 2014).  While 
the SPLM may have tolerated this ‘international superintendence’ (Khadiagala 2014) for 
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a short period, the increasing crackdown on an independent media and civil society over 
the course of 2013 showed this tolerance had some limits. 
It remains arguable that even if influential external actors had focused their attention and 
used all the tools of influence at their disposal – aid, threat of sanctions, oil embargos – 
that they still may not have been able to address the issues at the core of the SPLM and 
SPLA that have been identified as the causes of the December 2013 outbreak of violence 
(see de Waal and Mohammed 2014, Johnson 2014, The Sudd Institute 2014, and 
Rolandsen 2015).  External actors cannot reform institutions that are at the core of the 
functions of state – the military and political parties.  External actors can make 
recommendations and back these up with ‘carrots and sticks’, or provide generous 
funding to support national priorities, but at the end of the day only national leaders can 
address weaknesses in such institutions.  As Kiir said at independence: ‘we shall have no 
excuses or scapegoats to blame’. 
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Chapter Five – Observations and Conclusions 
The preceding research has sought to examine leadership and statebuilding in the very 
specific context of the transition of a rebel group to a governing entity of a post-conflict 
state.  This context allows for a consideration of the relationship of a leader to his or her 
own group, as well as the relationship of a leader to the institutions and people of the 
broader post-conflict state.  The level of stability that the post-conflict state enjoys is the 
ultimate measure of a successful transition from a rebel group to a governing party.  
While a measure of success, this stability comes about from a complex interaction 
between the decisions of leaders, the state institutions that they are able to build, and the 
influence of external actors.   
This research draws on several key theories of leadership that each set out to define its 
role, scope, and purpose.  As outlined in Chapter One, Burns (1977) defines leadership as 
the relationship between leaders and followers: ‘Leadership over human beings is 
exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilise, in competition or 
conflict with others, their own institutional, political, psychological and other resources in 
such a manner as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.  This is done in 
order to satisfy similar needs and values held by both leaders and followers.’  Keohane 
(2005) further refines this definition by noting as follows: ‘the scope of leadership differs 
from that of most other human activities.  The issues that leaders must address have broad 
implications, and a large number of human beings are affected.  In many situations, 
leadership involves an organisational context that gives this particular person the 
authority to make those decisions and assemble those resources.  No one else has the 
same opportunities or obligations.  There is a legitimacy about the leader’s role that sets it 
apart from other human behaviour’. 
Drawing on Weber’s theories of charismatic leadership and the ‘ethics of responsibility’, 
Levi (2006) and Leftwich (2009) locate political leadership within the enduring structure-
agency debate that seeks to explain socio-economic and political behaviour.  Leftwich 
summarises this debate: ‘On the one hand are explanations that give emphasis to 
structural and institutional factors which shape and govern behaviour; on the other hand 
are explanations which place greater emphasis on the autonomy of agents and agency.  In 
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short, what is the balance between structure and agency in explaining outcomes in any 
given situation?’.  Both Levi and Leftwich are able to resolve this by focusing on the 
interaction between leaders (agents) and institutions (structures).  As Levi says, 
‘leadership is empowered by institutions and popular support, but is also curbed by them’.  
Leftwich reiterates the importance of considering both institutions and leadership, noting 
that ‘institutions matter for stable and secure states, economic growth, political 
democracy and inclusive social development’; however, this ‘emphasis on institutions – 
that is the structural arrangements – has either ignored, or obscured human agency – 
individual or collective – from both analytical work and international policy and 
operational thinking and practices’.  Leftwich concludes that ‘following Weber, 
leadership must always be understood contextually, occurring within a given 
configuration of power, authority and legitimacy, shaped by history, institutions, goals 
and political culture’. 
This report has sought to analyse this complex interaction between leaders, the state 
institutions that they seek to build, and the influence of external actors that both enable 
and constrain their work in the cases of Mozambique and South Sudan.  This research has 
placed a particular emphasis on the relationship between leaders and their political parties 
– key institutions that they have the greatest interaction with – in the specific context of 
the transition from a rebel group to a political party able to exert authority over the 
territory of a new post-conflict state.  This emphasis is drawn from Khadiagala and Lyons’ 
work that identified the most successful cases of state reconstruction following civil war 
reveal leadership patterns of strong individuals operating within the constraints of 
organisations such as political parties or national/liberation movements (Khadiagala and 
Lyons 2006), as well as recent work by Lyons (2016) and Schlichte and Schneckener 
(2016) that focuses on how rebel groups derive political legitimacy in their transition 
from rebel group to political entity or government. 
Drawing on these theories, this report reaches several conclusions.  The post-conflict 
context presents very specific challenges for leaders and acts as both a constraint on 
leaders – as the tasks are difficult and many and the resources to implement few – and as 
an opportunity to act decisively with few institutional checks.  The key challenge for a 
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leader seeking long-term stability is often to build the institutions of state that will 
ultimately act as a constraint on his or her own leadership.  In the immediate post-conflict 
period the most likely institution able to constrain a leader is the very rebel group turned 
political party that he or she leads. 
One of Lyons’ (2016) conclusions is that successful rebel groups – i.e. those able to 
either win a civil war outright, or able to build sufficient legitimacy to be seen as the 
natural party to be negotiating a settlement of the conflict – should produce effective 
leaders.  This is because arguably only effective leaders have the ability to build and 
maintain the group coherence necessary to pursue a successful military or political 
strategy.  A successful group will over time have weeded out those unsuited to the task – 
for example because they pursued ill-fated military strategies or were unable to garner 
support from their group and split off into new factions, were kicked out, or worse.  
Leadership transitions, particularly those that are unexpected, test this notion. 
Observations from the Cases 
In Mozambique, FRELIMO experienced significant leadership turmoil in its first decade.  
Differences in goals and ideology saw genuine debate within the party on its direction 
and purpose, but also leadership assassinations, intrigue and power struggles.  The 
unexpected leadership transition following the assassination of Mondlane precipitated 
FRELIMO resolving its internal tensions and deciding on its preferred political and 
economic approach.  Those who disagreed with this direction left the party.  FRELIMO 
was fortunate in that it had resolved its internal debates and leadership disputes by the 
time Portugal sought to decolonise.  Even though the timing of independence was largely 
determined by external events in Portugal, FRELIMO’s leader Samora Machel was able 
to negotiate the terms and final timing with Portugal and crucially gain its agreement that 
FRELIMO be the party to lead the new state.  Upon independence, FRELIMO had a 
united political leadership, under a charismatic individual Samora Machel, who was able 
to attempt to build the institutions of state in accordance with a governing philosophy that 
had the full support of the party he led.  From Mondlane’s assassination in the late 1960s 
the political bureau of FRELIMO remained largely unchanged until the mid-1990s. 
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Even the assassination of Machel did not change the coherence and collectivity of 
FRELIMO.  Chissano continued to implement the economic policies that had been 
decided by the party at its Fourth Congress and continued to pursue the peace with South 
Africa that Machel had started through his earlier negotiation of the Nkomati Accord.  
Rather than a set-back the leadership transitions demonstrated the institutional strength of 
FRELIMO, characterised by its collective policy decision-making through regular Party 
Congresses and the importance it placed on projecting external unity while providing a 
platform for internal contestation.  
As we saw in Chapter Three, in recent years FRELIMO has started to show disunity, as 
different internal factions or ‘tendencies’ vie for supremacy.  This may not see 
FRELIMO split into smaller parties, but it risks undermining one of FRELIMO’s key 
institutional strengths.  That said a greater risk to FRELIMO in the short-term is the 
legitimacy it has lost from the rampant corruption in Mozambique that it has participated 
in, directly condoned, or allowed to flower by not building strong oversight institutions 
under its watch.  This goes directly to leadership, as it widely considered to have grown 
since the death of Machel – particularly under Chissano and Guebuza – to the point that 
Mozambicans look back at Machel’s leadership with considerable nostalgia, despite the 
early 1980s being a period of considerable deprivation in Mozambique. 
If Mozambique was fortunate that the timing of independence came at a time of unity in 
FRELIMO, then the opposite is true for South Sudan.  South Sudan’s leadership directly 
challenges Lyons’ contention that successful rebel groups produce effective leaders, as 
arguably only effective leaders have the ability to build and maintain the group coherence 
necessary to pursue a successful military or political strategy.  As Chapter Four outlines, 
the SPLM/A was rarely unified, often did not share a common vision or goal, and had 
consistently experienced fierce internal contestation that had often resulted in violence.  
Its greatest strength at the time of self-government in 2005 seems to have been the 
personal charisma and leadership of John Garang.  Ahead of CPA negotiations Garang 
had successfully brought back in many splinter groups, including Machar’s faction, and 
had been an authoritative presence in the negotiations gaining the confidence of key 
regional actors.  His death only three weeks after the start of self-government changed the 
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entire leadership equation of the SPLM, Sudan and Southern Sudan.  As Garang had not 
groomed a successor, his replacement followed the existing military hierarchy that placed 
in power a President and Vice-President with a deep personal animosity that stemmed 
from having been on opposing sides in a complex civil war.   
The leadership debates and disputes that have characterised the SPLM/A are vastly 
different from those that characterised the early years of FRELIMO.  The leadership 
contestation in South Sudan was not a Simango versus Machel debate of competing ideas 
for the future of the country – where the outcome would determine the ideology and 
vision of the ruling party.  Rather South Sudan’s leadership disputes were driven by 
personal grievances, ethnic solidarity and in the end the venal desire to control vast 
resources for the direct benefit of individual patronage networks.  That such disputes 
were occurring in the context of a highly militarised, deeply traumatised society proved 
disastrous.  To this day the negotiations to end the conflict are not based on identifying a 
governing philosophy or setting up more robust systems of political pluralism or 
contestation, but remain focused on how to accommodate a range of individuals who 
retain the loyalty of large armed groups.  Until these leaders are delegitimised from their 
followers it is impossible to see a different leader emerge, and certainly not one imposed 
externally. 
This is not to suggest that had Garang lived he would have ushered in a golden period of 
stability and development under his vision of a ‘New Sudan’.  Even if he had been able to 
convince the Afro-Arab elite of Sudan to follow him, he had already displayed worrying 
tendencies of authoritarianism in his leadership of the SPLM/A.  Those tendencies had 
directly led to the SPLM/A’s internal schisms, factions and splits, raising questions as to 
how long Garang could have offered stable leadership to either a unified Sudan or 
independent South Sudan. 
Comparing Mozambique to South Sudan, it is clear that the SPLM leadership has much 
more in common with RENAMO than FRELIMO.  Neither the SPLM nor RENAMO 
have a well-articulated political platform.  South Sudan’s current leaders have never 
sought to transition from leading a rebel group to leading a functioning political party.  
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All competing factions in the SPLM/A were only too quick to return to military solutions 
rather than any civilian institutional option when their leadership dispute reached its peak.   
RENAMO’s leader Afonso Dhlakama has proved slightly more patient than the leaders 
of the SPLM.  RENAMO has participated in all national elections since 1994, but as 
neither Dhlakama nor the party has ever won at the national level, each loss has caused 
Dhlakama to question the basis of both the 1989 constitution that RENAMO had to take 
as the ‘terms of its surrender’, as well as the content of the 1992 Rome Agreement that 
ended RENAMO’s war of destabilisation.  In 2012 Dhlakama’s patience ran out.  He has 
since led RENAMO back to its earlier tactics of low-level destabilisation via random 
violence and strategic attacks on key infrastructure as a way of gaining concessions from 
the FRELIMO government.  The government seems unwilling to meet his current 
demands for greater decentralisation, which in its view would see the end of Mozambique 
as a unitary state.  Dhlakama does not have the resources to take the north of 
Mozambique by force, but his ongoing intransigence combined with FRELIMO’s 
increasing weakness bodes ill for the trajectory of Mozambique’s stability. 
External actors have had a considerable influence on statebuilding in both Mozambique 
and South Sudan.  Both countries have been drawn into larger strategic power plays that 
have seen powerful external actors either support or directly undermine their 
statebuilding efforts. 
The impact of external actors on Mozambique is stark.  FRELIMO certainly made 
mistakes in its first years of independence and even if left alone may have been unable to 
overcome the challenges of poor policy and drought to build a strong state.  However, the 
establishment of a group by Rhodesia ‘to sabotage, to disrupt the population and to 
disrupt the economy’ of independent Mozambique followed by its well-resourced support 
from apartheid-era South Africa proved devastating to FRELIMO’s statebuilding project.  
Gains in health and education were lost, millions of Mozambicans were displaced and 
tens of thousands were killed in a 10-year destabilisation campaign that only ended at a 
point when the country’s people faced starvation. 
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Even those external actors actively seeking to support Mozambique did damage.  The 
SAPs put in place by the IMF and World Bank saw further cuts to health and education, 
massive price increases of staple goods, and cuts to the public service linked to the rise of 
endemic public sector corruption.  Despite Mozambique’s long-term reliance on foreign 
aid, this has not seen external actors, including bilateral donors, having any ability to 
influence the high-level corruption that currently characterises the state and that has 
increased since the liberalisation of the economy. 
Mozambique’s neighbours continue to have an interest in its stability.  Landlocked 
neighbours still rely on Mozambique’s ports and roads for trade and Mozambique’s 
power generation capacity still supplies other countries in Southern Africa.  The ongoing 
mediation effort between FRELIMO and RENAMO underscores this interest, even if the 
prospects for a solution in the short-term are slight. 
Like Mozambique, South Sudan’s neighbours – most obviously Sudan – have directly 
influenced its statebuilding project.  Implementation of the CPA preoccupied South 
Sudanese leaders throughout the interim and transition periods.  Threats from Sudan 
along the border and in the disputed area of Abyei justified increased military 
mobilisation at a time when statebuilding theory points to the need for demobilisation and 
strengthening civilian institutions.  In the same period the actions of Khartoum in Darfur 
distracted external supporters – particularly the UN and the US, which played a 
considerable role for decades in supporting South Sudan’s independence – from focusing 
on the statebuilding challenge South Sudan faced ahead of independence.  
South Sudan’s ‘neigbourhood’ in the Horn of Africa has also been influential.  The Horn 
of Africa is of considerable strategic importance and a location of considerable political 
and military activity for a large number of external actors.  The fortunes of the SPLM and 
South Sudan as an independent state have often been tied to broader relationships of 
external actors to Sudan (such as the US, Israel, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia), and 
broader dynamics around regional and global counter-terrorism and earlier Cold War 
alliances.  Neighbours such as Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been drawn directly 
into the current conflict on both the side of the government and Machar’s SPLM-IO.  All 
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have been impacted to varying degrees by the displacement of South Sudanese fleeing 
the fighting. 
It is for all these reasons that South Sudan’s neighbours, through the regional group 
IGAD, have an interest in negotiating an end to the current fighting.  Since fighting began 
peace efforts have had multiple strands – country-to-country through IGAD, party-to-
party efforts at times led by the governing parties of Ethiopia and South Africa, and 
multilaterally through efforts to find measures to influence the parties in the UN Security 
Council.  These efforts will have little impact so long as those who command the loyalty 
of considerable numbers of armed fighters see greater value in fighting than in seeking 
peace. 
Conclusions 
Returning to the research questions of how leaders transitioned from fighting a civil war 
to leading a civilian government in Mozambique and South Sudan, this report has directly 
analysed how FRELIMO in Mozambique and the SPLM in South Sudan transitioned 
from civil war to civilian government and created and maintained institutions of state.  It 
has considered the interaction between leaders and political parties and the influence of 
external actors in this process of transition and statebuilding, and sought to identify the 
impact of these interactions and influences on peace. 
This report contends that a critical causal mechanism in a successful transition is 
establishing and maintaining legitimacy – both internally with the governed population 
and externally with key international partners.  How leaders balanced internally derived 
and externally derived legitimacy has often proved to be important.  External actors were 
often fundamental in bestowing legitimacy on these armed groups, even when there were 
other groups claiming to represent the interests of the population.  In both cases 
charismatic early leaders of the movements were able to persuade key external actors to 
back their cause or movement, which ultimately proved influential in the negotiated 
settlements that gave both FRELIMO and the SPLM power upon independence/self-
government.  While externally derived legitimacy was important in getting these parties 
into power, the sources of internal legitimacy, derived from their own populations by 
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parties and leaders, were critical in shaping their ability to offer stable government.  Each 
case demonstrates that legitimacy must be maintained in order to maintain stability.  
Mozambique’s leaders may still regain what they have lost if they are able to address 
corruption.  South Sudan’s leaders rapidly lost their legitimacy, certainly externally, and 
amongst the parts of the population who consider that they no longer (or have never) 
represented their interests or aspirations. 
Both cases highlight, for different reasons, that leaders matter particularly when 
institutions are weak.  Drawing on theories of leadership and political legitimacy, this 
report contends that these differences, alongside other factors such as the influence of 
external actors, contributed to the different levels of political stability in Mozambique 
and South Sudan after the transition from war.  The level of political stability directly 
affected the ability of the new governing party to establish and build the institutions of 
state, which ultimately affected the sustainability of peace in each country.   
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